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Abstract
This research is designed to test the role reflecting on and sharing values plays in our
individual decision-making schemas in a group. The research is based on evidence from
the literature that values play a role in economic decision-making, can be formed and
utilized either consciously or unconsciously, and impact microeconomic decision-making
and ethics in organizations. The study found that when decision considerations were
reframed in a values context the decision-making process became more quasi-rational,
but the decisions participants made were as good or better than they were before values
were introduced. In some cases decision-makers became less interested in personal
considerations after decisions were framed in a values context. This is an important
finding because traditional models of economic decision-making assume the decisionmaking process is always rational and decision-makers are always self-interested. There
may also be some relationship between utilizing values and improved ethical decisionmaking for women within small groups with relatively strong relationships in a
community.
Keywords: economic decision-making, schemas, values, values in decisionmaking, organizational behavior.
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An Exploratory Study of the Role of Values in Microeconomic Decision-Making and the
Implications for Organizations and Leaders

Chapter 1
Introduction

Much of the traditional economic decision-making models that are still in use
today are based on the assumptions of rational choice and self-interest. These
assumptions create a fact/value dichotomy. However, there is evidence that while
assumptions of rationality and self-interest are normative constructs, the way we actually
make decisions incorporates both facts and values (Bell, 2011b; Binmore, 2007; Nelson,
2003; Putnam, 2002). The purpose of this exploratory research is to test the role
reflecting on and sharing values plays in our individual decision-making schemas in
groups. Specifically, can introducing values into decision considerations disrupt existing
unconscious schemas? Implications for microeconomic decision-making in organizations
will also be considered.

Research Questions
The framework of this exploratory study was based on the following research
questions:


What role do values play in microeconomic and other decision-making?



How does the reflection on and sharing of personal values associated with
decisions impact future decisions?
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How does sharing personal values with others impact their decision-making
schemas?

Hypotheses
This study used an instrument designed to measure unconscious schemas in
ethical decision-making using a pre- and posttest design. The instrument, the DIT2, has
proven very reliable and has been used in over 400 published studies (see “Instrument”
section of this paper). Extensive use of the DIT2 has found that pre- and posttest results
without any intervention have proven to be the same with no statistically significant
movements in scores (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). Based on that data we
can assume that if the planned intervention in this experiment has had no impact on
decision-making, the statistically significant differences in the mean values of any
measured data pre- and posttest will be 0. Given this information the hypotheses are as
follows:
H0: D = 0
H1: D ≠ 0
Where D is the difference between mean DIT2 scores.

Constructs and Definitions
The discussion of value-inclusive economic decision-making introduces
constructs that not everyone might be familiar with. For purposes of this study the
following definitions were utilized:
Decision considerations. A decision consideration is a matter weighed or taken
into account when forming a decision.

2
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Opportunity set. The opportunity set in decision-making is defined by Sen
(1994) as “the anticipated set of alternative outcomes…which the person reckons she can
have through different choices of her strategy” (p. 385). One example would be a
manager who wishes to solve a problem in which an employee has excessive absences
(the strategy is to solve the absence problem). The opportunity set is the set of alternative
actions the manager believes he or she can take to solve the problem. The opportunity set
can be influenced by factors other than rational choice like ethics and epistemology
(within the values ether) causing “menu-dependency”.
Menu dependence. When the opportunity set is influenced by ethics, social
behavior, epistemology, or other non-rational choice influences that narrows the
opportunity set. A good example of menu-dependent behavior is choosing not to take the
last apple in a bowl (Sen, 1994).
Decision set. The decision set is the actual outcome chosen from the opportunity
set. In the example above it would be the action the manager actually takes (or intends to
take) to solve the problem. This could be a single decision by a single person, but is most
often used to describe the aggregate of decisions made by a number of individuals facing
a similar problem or situation. The decision and its impacts may influence future
opportunity sets and decisions (Bell, 2011b; Sen, 1994).
Personal Values. These are a type of value to which an individual is committed
and which influences his or her behavior (Kaushal & Janjhua, 2011; Theodorson &
Achilles, 1969).
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Schemas. The group of values/ethics/morals an individual unconsciously
possesses in long-term memory that structure and guide an individual’s thinking and
decision-making.
Values. Several short definitions of values exist including:
“Values can refer to the desired or to the desirable, and the two are not
equivalent…values determine our subjective definition of rationality”
(Hofstede, 2001, pp. 1-6).
Prescriptive statements of what ought to be (Putnam, 2002).
However, for this study we used Hall, Guo, and Davis (2002) more comprehensive
definition. They define values as:
…cognitive scripts or cognitive maps or as value schemata (determinants
of action)…[values] define the primary perspective that an individual uses
to make sense of a new problem scenario and to generate solutions. These
values generate perspectives that fundamentally restrict the way the
individuals ‘see’ the world, interpret information, and make decisions…
there are six types of personal values (perspectives) that individuals
exhibit…theoretical, social, political, religious, aesthetic, and economic.
(pp. 2-3)
Values can also be used as a form of persuasion in “situations of practical
reasoning”, which is consistent with the assertions of this paper. Bench-Capon
(2003) describe the role of values in these cases is to “persuade rather than to
prove, demonstrate or refute” (p. 429). He further states that:

4
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…persuasion in such cases relies on a recognition that the strength of an
argument depends on the social values that it advances, and that whether
the attack of one argument on another succeeds depends on the
comparative strength of the values advanced by the arguments concerned.
(p. 429)
It is also important to note that the terms values, morals, and ethics are
often used interchangeably to express the same construct. For purposes of this
paper they are considered the same.
Values ether. It is the unseen medium that binds together all the value factors that
lead us to a decision.
Values reflection. Refers to internally contemplating the values associated with
decision considerations.
Values sharing. Refers to sharing the values you have assigned to decision
considerations with others.

Delimitations
While the types of factors beyond rational self-interest that individuals consider
are numerous, this study will be delimited to values. Specifically, whether reflection on
and sharing of values related to decision-making criteria impacts the way in which
individuals make ethical decisions in a group.
As the types of economic decisions individuals make are numerous the scope of
the study will be delimited to microeconomic applications for individual value-inclusive
decisions in groups.

VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING

6

Significance of the Study
Much has been written about the mechanical-mathematical models of economic
decision-making based on assumptions of rational self-interest and utility maximization
for both individuals and organizations, yet little attention has been given to the empirical
study of the role of values in individual decision-making in groups and how this might
impact microeconomic decision-making in organizations. Specifically, whether reflecting
on and sharing values associated with decision considerations changes the unconscious
schemas individuals’ develop that influence their decision-making. If these schemas can
be disrupted, it provides support for the influence of group, societal, environmental, and
organizational values in microeconomic decision-making creating implications for
organizations and managers.
This research is timely as academicians and practitioners are looking for ways to
incorporate (and explain) behavioral and other factors in decision-making that go beyond
rational choice (Pressman, 2005; Putnam, 2002; Sen, 1994, 2004, 2005; Thaler &
Sunstein, 2009; ). Some less prominent, yet equally antithetical theories seek ways to
create more organic models and incorporate complex systems and ‘new science’ to
explain observations of human decision-making behavior (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009;
Mikhalevskii, 1971; Wheatley, 2006).
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

This literature review begins by developing a theory of value-inclusive economic
decision-making that will be used as the basis for this research. Alternative models and
theories of value-inclusive economic decision-making from the literature will also be
reviewed. The literature review concludes with a more specific discussion of valueinclusive microeconomic decision-making including individual value development and
the importance of value-inclusive microeconomic decision-making in organizations.
Toward Value-Inclusive Economic Decision-Making1

Much of contemporary economic thought seeks to remove all value judgments
from the discussion of economic decision-making in favor of the rational choice
tautology. Considerations of the “softer” social science aspects of economic thought have
been replaced with mechanical-mathematical models in an effort to move the discipline
closer to the hard sciences (Binmore, 2007; Nelson, 2003; Putnam, 2002). In order to
allow empirical testing of the established mathematical models, the assumption of
rational actors is required. To address the issues of complexity associated with economic
decision-making that makes absolute rationality problematic, many economists consider
the rationality assumption to be bounded rationality; limited by time, available
information, and cognitive ability.

1

Note: This portion of the paper was originally published open source in 2011 in the European Journal of
Social Sciences, 21(4), 638-649. The publisher has granted permission for use of the manuscript by the
author for educational and non-profit purposes. It has been modified for this paper, but remains
significantly as originally published.
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The purpose of this section is to explore whether there is a more holistic and
organic approach to economic theory that allows for the coexistence of facts and values
within economics while simultaneously moving closer to the hard sciences, specifically
the natural and physical sciences.

Statements of Fact in the Classical Language of Science:
The Rational Actor

As discussed previously, the utilization of scientific mathematical models requires
the assumption of rational actors in economic decision-making. This assumption has
become problematic for many scholars (Angner & Loewenstein, 2007; Putnam, 2002;
Tideman, 2005; Yuengert, 2000). Do individuals always behave rationally? Does one
person define rationality the same as another? If a decision is rational for one person is
the same decision also rational for another? Most people can look at anecdotal evidence
in our own lives that indicates people do not always act in a rational manner. Many
factors such as stress, emotions, experience, and moral or ethical values can all impact
“rational” decision-making.
The language of science does not allow for the consideration of these
psychological or value factors in the analysis of economic decision-making. Value
statements are viewed as subjective, while “fact” statements are considered objective and
appropriate for scientific analysis. In science “matters of fact” are considered statements
that describe what “is” while “relations of ideas” (values) are prescriptive statements of
what “ought” to be (Putnam, 2002). Putnam describes the split of values and facts in the
“scientific” study of economics as going beyond a distinction to a jointly exhaustive and
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mutually exclusive dichotomy that does not allow facts and values to coexist within the
analysis.

History of the Fact/Value Dichotomy
Aristotle first proposed a distinction between facts and values, which he described
as positive (what is) and normative (what one should do) inquiry. However, until the
early twentieth century positive and normative inquiry within the sciences, while
distinctive, coexisted in a hierarchical relationship. Ethics/prudence was “by nature above
all other disciplines”. This normative inquiry made use of the subordinate inquiries “in
pursuit of the highest human ends, and was in turn the justification and motivating force
behind the inquiries of the various subordinate sciences” (Yuengert, 2000, p. 1).
The fact/value dichotomy of the early twentieth century created problems
regarding how “facts” should be defined within the language of science. Putnam (2002)
provides a comprehensive discussion of these issues summarized in the following
paragraphs. The logical positivism that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century
believed that judgments fell into one of three classifications:
1) “Synthetic” judgments were those that were empirically verifiable or falsifiable.
2) “Analytic” judgments were true [or false] on the basis of logical rules alone.
3) “Cognitively Meaningless” judgments included ethical, metaphysical, and
aesthetic judgments. These value judgments were not considered within the field
of science.
Distinguishing between synthetic and analytic judgments was problematic in part
because there was a difference of opinion about whether the truths of mathematics were
analytic or synthetic. Kant believed mathematics is both synthetic and a priori while the
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logical positivists believed the principles of mathematics are analytical. When the
assumption (as discussed by Putnam, 2002) that the principles of mathematics are
synthetic is removed, there becomes a wide range of ordinary distinctions (both analytic
and purely descriptive) available.
Another problem raised by the logical positivists was that in order for the
synthetic/analytic distinction to be true, it must work when applied to every statement of
theoretical physics. For example, we must ask if the Principle of the Conservation of
Energy is analytic or synthetic in order to fully “rationalize” physics. This proved to be
problematic, as atoms could not be “observed” before microscopes; and physics moved
into the areas of relativity theory and quantum mechanics. Yet many scientists believed
that a scientific statement of fact must be “conclusively verifiable by confrontation and
direct experience” (Putnam, 2002, p. 22). The language of science continued to insist,
“the predicates admitted into the ‘factual’ part of the language of science had to be
‘observational terms’ or reducible (by specified and limited means) to observation terms”
(Putnam, 2002, p.23). The “reductionistic unholistic view” (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009) of
science made discussions about bacteria, electrons, charges, or the gravitational field
irrational.

Application Problems of Mechanical-Mathematical Economic Models
As the previous discussion of Putnam’s work emphasizes, the language of the
hard sciences seeks rational outcomes based on statements of fact that are empirically
measurable. This requires the dichotomy of facts and values. However, defining “facts” is
problematic even in the hard sciences.
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In an effort to allow “scientific” mathematical analysis of economics, the
assumption must be made that the actors involved act in a rational, self-interested manner
with factual judgments separated from value judgments in economic decision-making.
The implication of the assumption of rationality is that actors will seek to maximize
utility through their economic decision-making. This also assumes that they have all
information required to make the optimal decision, have not learned from previous
experiences, and are not influenced by other people; rationality is assumed to be inherent
(Putnam, 2002).
Researchers in strategic behavior have found problems with these assumptions
when using game theory to study rational behavior in small groups where individual
actors can impact the well-being of others. The results found that multiple equilibria were
possible and that a “very high order” of rationality was needed to determine an
individual’s optimal strategy. The studies also found that learning and natural selection
can have an impact on optimal behavior in practice (Schmalensee, 1991). Other
experiments found that while individual “reasoners” behave intelligently, they do behave
differently than the theory of pure economic rationality would expect (“Philosophy of
Economics,” 1998)
To address the issue of the inability of individual actors to consistently act in a
rational manner, the subject of economics was divided into micro-and macroeconomics to
accommodate (and inspired by) Keynes and his General Theory (Groenewegen, 2003).
Keynes believed that economic behavior should be measured at the aggregate level and
not the “atomic” or micro level of neoclassical theory (Togati, 2001). Using the rational,
mechanical, mathematical, and fact driven structure of the hard sciences made discussion
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of economics at the “atomic” level as difficult as it did for physics. However, Keynes’
approach was consistent with the increasingly narrow specialization within the hard
sciences (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009).
The mechanical aspects of the classical language of science are also problematic
when applied to the study of economics. The mechanical, fact driven model of classical
science creates a relatively closed system of exploration. As a result, economic models
utilizing this system end up closed within the confines of science. An extensive list of
assumptions, described by Mikhalevskii (1971), are required to fit within the confines of
a closed, mechanical system. Among them are the assumptions of “a consistent, stable,
and …constant system of values” and conformity to the utility maximization criterion as
the only constant and final goal. Mikhalevskii also finds “the narrowness of the
statistical and dynamic definition of individual and social motivation” to be problematic
(pp. 7-8). Mechanical models fail to consider relationships and their impact on the overall
economic system. He states there is no:
…mechanism for explaining internal conflicts in the process of development
(except competition) on the basis of the influence of the environment and the
internal structure of the very system through direct relations and feedback and
compounding relations based upon them… (p. 8)
There is also no mechanism to measure the impact of individuals on the system when
utilizing a Keynesian macroeconomic approach (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009).
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The New Science
Language Beyond “Fact”
As previously discussed, the classical language of science, using restrictive
statements of fact, made discussion about bacteria, electrons, charges, or the gravitational
field irrational. This became increasingly problematic as “new science” emerged in
biology, evolution, chaos theory, relativity theory, and quantum physics. Suddenly
science was forced to look at the world in a different way. The world began to appear less
mechanical and orderly, and more creative, dynamic, and engaged in continuous change
while maintaining order. (Wheatley, 2006)
Ganley (1995) discusses the revolutionary fervor of theoretical physics at the
beginning of the twentieth century. Areas of expanded theoretical interest for scientists
included quantum physics, the special and general theories of relativity, a theory of the
inner workings of the atom, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, quantum mechanics, and
the early stages of research in quantum electrodynamics. Research in the “new science”
created changes in methodology for scientists. The world around them was no longer
viewed as strictly mechanical and outside our influence. Ganley quotes Albert Einstein
regarding the new physics: “physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and
are not, however, it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world” (p. 397).
Establishment of the new language of physics also required a new way of thinking
about the world. Scientists were forced to look beyond “facts” to possibilities,
probabilities and not just predictions. They came to realize that the natural world did not
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always behave the same way twice, yet maintained orderliness (Wheatley, 2006). As
Fritjof Capra (1983) stated:
In their struggle to grasp this new reality, scientists became painfully aware
that their basic concepts, their language, and their whole way of thinking were
inadequate to describe atomic phenomena. Their problem was not only
intellectual but involved an intense emotional and existential experience… (p.
76)
One example included experiments that determined electrons behave in an inconsistent
manner. Sometimes they behave like particles (matter) and at other times they behave
like waves (energy) (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009).
Bozicnik & Matjaz (2009) describes the evolution of scientific thought moving
from determinism, to interdependence, to dialectical dynamics that recognize the “unity
in diversity of everything around us” (p.347).

The New Economics?
While changes in language and methodology were being made in the scientific
community to change the way natural phenomena were discussed, predicted, and
described, the economic discipline was slow to respond. Noted historian and philosopher
of economic thought, Philip Mirowski, believed that neoclassical economics was based
on mid-nineteenth century physics that clung to outdated mathematical techniques that
did not seek to make economics like science, but “a mathematically rigorous discipline”
(Ganley, 1995, p.398). Science had evolved, with scientists like Einstein allowing for
nonobservable factors (Togati, 2001). However, the study of economics has not evolved
in the same manner primarily in the name of mathematical rigor.
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Economists agree that mathematics is still important to “provide a social-scientific
basis for understanding, explaining, and, perhaps, predicting economic phenomena”
(Routledge, 1998, para 10). However, when economists ask a question such as: “Are
inflation and unemployment related?” they may be able to use mathematical models to
answer yes or no, but economists need to go beyond mathematics to explain the oftenunobservable causes. On this topic the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Sciences
states:
…the approach to economic theorizing that stipulates that the discipline is
purely formal will not aid in shedding light on these real, though
unobservable, economic mechanisms. On this line of thought, the persistent
mathematization of economics ought to be construed as a means to an end
rather than the end itself. The formal or mathematical machinery of economics
is intellectually valuable only insofar as it contributes to a better
understanding of real, empirically given economic processes, causes, and
systems. (para. 10)
The “new economics” should look beyond the assumptions of economic actors
being rational, self-interested, and autonomous maximizers required to fit the science of
economics into the “Newtonian idea of a clockwork world” (Nelson, 2003, p. 5). Looking
beyond requires economists to include unobservable factors such as values, ethics,
expectations, motivations, culture, and the impact of relationships and cooperation on
economic decision-making.
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Origins of a Potential New Economics

This paper has discussed how the origins of the neoclassical school of economic
research was found in mid-nineteenth century physics (Ganley, 1995) as economists
sought to utilize the same mathematical methodology. The early twentieth century
brought a division of micro- and macroeconomics to accommodate Keynes by removing
the problems associated with the rational explanation of both science and economics at
the “atomic” level (Groenewegen, 2003). While the methodology of science was
evolving as new fields of inquiry emerged, the field of economics did not respond in a
similar manner. Some scholars might argue that Keynes was using Einstein’s approach to
the theory of relativity when he developed his General Theory of Employment, Interest,
and Money, (Togati, 2001) others, including this author, see applications to Einstein’s
theory of relativity that are quite different. If the origins of the new economics didn’t
reside with Keynes, where did (or will) they come from? The answer to this question
requires revisiting the origins of the science of economics.
The first attempt to establish an analytical form of economic science was made by
François Quesnay and a group of French statesmen and philosophers in the mideighteenth century. The foundation of their policy was obedience to Nature (Marshall,
1890/1920). However, as Marshall goes on to explain, these early economists lost their
way when they attempted to incorporate the scientific methods of the physical sciences:
…there was much in the tone and temper of their treatment of political and
social questions which was prophetic of a later age. They fell however into a
confusion of thought which was common even among scientific men of their
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time, but which has been banished after a long struggle from the physical
sciences. They confused the ethical principle of conformity to Nature, which
is expressed in the imperative mood, and prescribes certain laws of action,
with those causal laws which science discovers by interrogating Nature, and
which are expressed in the indicative mood. (Marshall, 1890/1920; Appendix
B.7)
Statements of fact rather than signals of direction continue to dominate economic
thought in the twenty-first century. Another important point to note regarding the
structure of the emerging economic science as described by both Quesnay and Adam
Smith is that the micro- and macroeconomic elements were blended and merged, treating
the subject as a whole without artificial distinctions. The intellectual climate also allowed
for positive and normative economics to exist simultaneously. Smith, and later Marshall,
blended their discussion of economics with a mix of facts and theories (Bozicnik &
Matjaz, 2009; Groenewegen, 2003).
After Quesnay, Marshall credits Adam Smith as having the next great step in
advance within the discipline of economics. The very title of Smith’s major work, An
Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, implies economic systems
are natural phenomena. It also calls for the exploration of causation, not simply factual
description. He also recognizes the unobservable by noting that while man may attempt
to control these natural economic systems, they continue to be “led by an invisible hand
to promote an end which was not part of his intention” (Smith, 1776/1904; para. IV.2.9).
Smith (1776/1904) was also concerned with the “evolutionary factors in
explaining economic development,” which included discussion about the nature of
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society and government, and the role of culture and the arts. Smith saw economic systems
as dynamic and constantly changing (Bozicnik & Matjaz, 2009; Groenewegen, 2003). He
also recognized the role of “moral” and “natural” sentiments of economic actors in
decision-making (Smith, 1759/1790).
Sen (2004) discusses a deeper analysis of Adam Smith’s work that demonstrates
that Smith did not believe self-interest was the only motivator of people. He states: “…he
discussed extensively the prevalence and the important social role of such values as
sympathy, generosity, public-spiritedness and other affiliative concerns” (p.9). In another
work Sen (1994) discusses that the pioneers of utility theory (including John Stuart Mill,
William Stanley Jevons, Francis Y. Edgeworth, and Alfred Marshall) explicitly accepted
a variety of motivations for economic decision-making.
Based on this discussion it is fair to conclude that early economic theorists
believed that the discussion of economics belonged within the context of our natural and
holistic world, which includes multiple motivations for economic decision-making. The
science of economics lost this framework of discussion when it moved toward the
increasingly factual language of the physical sciences. The language and methodology of
the sciences changed at the beginning of the twentieth-century, while the field of
economics remained trapped within the mid-nineteenth century model. However,
returning to the origins of economic science reveals greater parity with the “new science”
than current mechanical-mathematical models. Based on this evidence, is it possible to
build a theoretical framework for the discussion of economic decision-making that is
consistent with both classical economic thought and the new science?
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A Model of Decision-Making Beyond the Rational Actor

While the discussion of economic models within the context of classical
economic thought and the new science has broad applications, the limited space of this
paper requires the scope of this discussion to be limited to economic decision-making.
While the discussion thus far has focused on a potential “new economics,” it is probably
necessary to further define and identify what that encompasses. To be consistent with
contemporary scientific thought, this paper will use Bozicnik and Matjaz (2009)
description of a holistic, interdependence-based system that recognizes the “unity in
diversity of everything around us.” This “new science” view of economic systems allows
for:
1) Inclusion of the unobservable.
2) Recognition of complex systems.
3) The ability of the individual “atomic” actor to influence the system and
determine “reality” with their interventions.
4) The ability of the system to influence the actor.
5) Multiple equilibria and inconsistent behavior.
6) Recognition of the role of relationships and cooperation in economic behavior.
7) Inclusion of values/ethics/morality.
8) Inclusion of information and learning in decision-making.
This view is also consistent with classical economic thought in that it looks at
economic systems holistically with no division between micro and macro elements, or
positive and normative statements. Fact and theory are allowed to coexist. It allows for
the inclusion of “sentiments” (values, ethics, and morals), the unobservable (i.e. the
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invisible hand), the exploration of causation across a broad spectrum of possibilities, and
allows for “evolution” of economic systems with changing cause and effect that can
include multiple goals and objectives over time.

Einstein and the Ether
The major inspiration for the value-inclusive economic decision-making model
discussed later in this paper was an address delivered on May 5th, 1920, in the University
of Leyden by Albert Einstein entitled Ether and the Theory of Relativity. This insight into
Einstein’s views of the “new science” has strong parallels with a potential theoretical
model for economic decision-making.
In his address, Einstein rejects Newton’s notion of dualism in nature, both in
general and as it relates to the theory of gravity. Specifically, that there can be “reciprocal
action only through contact, and not through immediate action at a distance” (Einstein,
1920, p. 1). To solve this problem, and to unify the view of the nature of forces, Einstein
supports the existence of an “ether.” The ether is an inert medium that fills up universal
space and conveys forces by elastic deformation of the medium. This explains how
movement is possible with both direct contact (mechanical and seen) and distant contact
(non-mechanical and unseen). This is much like a boat being able to be moved through
the water either by pushing it (direct contact) or by the ripples created by the wake of
another boat (distant contact).
The ether allows both seen mechanical forces like densities, velocities, and
stresses to coexist with the unseen electric and magnetic forces, and abandons the
dualism that existed. He also states: “the ether of the general theory of relativity is a
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medium which is itself devoid of all mechanical and kinematical qualities, but helps to
determine mechanical (and electromagnetic) events” (Einstein, 1920, p. 4). Einstein also
describes ether as being indistinguishable from ponderable matter, which, at least in part,
subsists in the ether. Within the theory of relativity the state of the ether is “at every place
determined by connections with the matter and the state of the ether in neighbouring
places…” (p. 5). In other words, the state of the ether is determined by its relationships
with the matter and its state relative to the states around it.
While the ether was necessary for Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity, he is
said to have rejected it later when he developed his Special Theory of Relativity.
Hawking (2001) states that Einstein believed that the notion of an ether was “redundant,”
as proposed in a 1905 article. Yet in the 1920 address discussed here he does not reject
the notion of an ether, simply a change in his conception of it. Einstein states: “More
careful reflection teaches us, however, that the special theory of relativity does not
compel us to deny ether” (p. 3). Einstein believed we could continue to assume the
existence of an ether, but we must not ascribe to it a definite state of motion, removing all
mechanical characteristics as discussed earlier in this section. He does believe, however,
that the ether can still be characterized as a medium.

Einstein Meets Economics
The problem with dualism in nature faced by Einstein parallels with the dualism
problem associated with the fact/value dichotomy of current economic thought. The
assumption of the dichotomy is that economic statements can be made through fact alone
and not through the influence of values. According to Hume, we cannot determine an
“ought” from an “is” (Putnam, 2002). However, to be consistent with the new science,
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the fact/value dichotomy should be removed because “evaluation and description are
interwoven and interdependent” (Pressman, 2005; p. 485)
The values ether. To unify this view of economics the existence of a “values
ether” as a medium through which statements, thought, and information move is
proposed. Einstein (1920) describes the ether as both conditioning the behavior of inert
masses, and being conditioned by them. In the economic decision-making process (which
moves through the “values ether”), the ether not only conditions our decisions, but is also
conditioned by our decisions. Also consistent with Einstein’s theory, economic decisions
are partially conditioned by decisions outside the territory under consideration (see
Einstein, 1920, p. 4). While the decisions themselves do not reside within the values
ether, the statements, thoughts, information, and previous decisions necessary to make
new decisions move through the medium of the values ether and help determine
economic decisions.
The ongoing conditioning of the ether and the statements, thoughts, information,
and previous decisions moving through it causes learning to take place and economic
decisions to change over time. It also causes individuals, businesses, and societies to react
differently to different economic stimuli even when they have the same information,
especially over time. Mikhalevskii (1971) sees the future of economic analysis being
based on continuous learning: “…the entire mechanism of economic decisions must be
based on a heurorhythmic procedure” (p.20).
Relationships and cooperation. Pressman (2005) discusses the role of Pareto
Optimality in modern economic thought that goes hand in hand with the assumptions of
individual self-interest and rationality. For an outcome to be Pareto Optimal, no one can
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be made better off without sacrificing the well-being of at least one person. As a result,
the situation cannot “unambiguously be improved upon, since one person’s gain will be
another person’s loss” (p. 487). Yet, neoclassical economics, measured at the macro
level, does not allow us to compare individual gains and losses (Pressman, 2005).
Are relationships, cooperation, and rationality able to coexist? Pressman states:
“…rationality has a social dimension to it; what is rational in a situation depends not just
on what I do or choose, but also on how others react to me and to my choices” (p.490).
This concept of relationships is consistent with Einstein’s statement that “…the state of
the ether is at every place determined by connections with the matter and the state of the
ether in neighbouring places…” (1920, p. 5).
An understanding of relationships in economic decision-making helps place
individual decisions in context. For example, is an individual more likely to make an
unethical economic decision such as cheating on their income taxes if their superior at
work has encouraged them to do so? Sen (1994) discusses how social norms can have an
impact on decision-making. He uses the examples of not eating the last apple, or
automatically grabbing the largest slice of cake. Also, the decisions of individuals living
in societies with collectivist norms will be very different from those living in societies
with individualist norms.
Another motivation for decision-making explored by Sen (1994) includes the
consideration of the consequences of individual actions on others. Will someone else be
harmed or will someone be disappointed in the decision-maker due to the decision? Is
the decision-maker trying to imitate the behavior of others? What are the decision-makers
incentives within the different groups they identify with (Sen, 2004)? These relationship
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considerations exist within the values ether and shape economic decisions. At the same
time, economic decisions shape relationships.
The game theory classic, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, demonstrates that the optimal
solution can sometimes be gained through cooperation. While the game does not
eliminate the possibility that individuals are self-interested, as the cooperative solution
also optimizes each individual’s benefit. It does, however, demonstrate that the
consideration of others should (and does) exist in individual economic decision-making.
The previous discussion regarding relationships also implies that there are occasions
when actors might not act in their own best interest in order to protect the interests of
others. Once again, this does not necessarily mean that individuals are not self-interested
(as an individual might gain more utility from helping someone else than from satisfying
their own immediate need), it simply means there are considerations in economic
decision-making that involve other people. Regional and international trade networks are
examples of cooperation that have economic benefits at a macroeconomic level as they
can increase resistance to recessionary shocks (He & Deem, 2010).
Sen (1994) suggests that due to social dependence, each member of a group
considers not only their independent self-interest, but also treats the joint strategy as one
of their options. In some cases this might even lead to individuals within the group being
less well off then others when cohesive actions are more desired. In his example he cites
gender-unequal societies in which women themselves might give a higher priority to the
interests and well being of the joint family unit while perpetuating their own inequality
and lower status.

VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING

25

Pressman (2005) concludes that the fact/value dichotomy and notion of selfinterested rationality trivializes values because relationships and cooperation with other
people creates a “social surplus.” By including other elements of behavior to the
observation of microeconomic behavior something much greater than a simple
aggregation of Pareto Optimality of microeconomic level data occurs. Mikhalevskii
(1971) states:
Even in the area of the purely economic system of values, goals, and norms,
not only is the law of superadditivity justified, but each given goal at the
macroeconomic level is qualitatively different from the corresponding
microeconomic values. (p. 19)
Sen (1994) concludes that including “other-regarding concerns in the formulation of
rational choice” will provide “better description and greater explanatory and predictive
power” (p.389).
Relativity. Another implication of Einstein’s statement regarding the state of the
ether being “at every place determined by connections with the matter and that state of
the ether in neighbouring places…” (1920, p. 5) is the concept (and theory) of relativity.
This relativity takes two forms in economic decision-making: 1) Decisions (including
values) relative to the values of others; and 2) The observed meaning of decisions
(including values) by others. While some might argue that the values ether represents
values (or moral) relativism, this author argues that it is simply a descriptive relativism
that recognizes that people disagree about the right or wrong course of action to be taken
under similar circumstances when presented with the same facts. Values, experience and
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learning, perceptions of justice, relationships, and joint cooperation all play a part in this
relativity.
Ganley (1995) remarks that Veblen also recognized the concept that “conceptual
meaning was that of the observer” (p. 403). Often an individual’s decision will be shaped
based on how they believe another person will perceive their decision. For example, a job
applicant may decide not to call a perspective new employer more than once because,
while eager to have the job, they don’t want the potential employer to think they are too
assertive or “pushy”.
Actors may also compare their values to those of others when making decisions.
When we observe a co-worker demonstrating generosity with a substantial donation to
the office charity campaign, we might wish to appear equally (or even more) generous
when we make our donation. As statements, thoughts, and information move through the
values ether, decisions are formed creating new statements, thoughts, and information
that are all relative to one another.

Classifications of Statements, Thoughts, and Information

The mid-nineteenth century language of science that continues to dominate
economics requires consideration of “matters of fact” exclusively. However, the “new
science” recognizes the need to discuss possibilities and probabilities in a world that is
creative, dynamic, and engaged in continuous change while maintaining order. Revisiting
the pioneers of the science of economics, including Quesnay, Smith, and Marshall, finds
their approaches to be more holistic and consistent with the new science. They saw the
positive and normative (fact/value) as interdependent, micro and macro-level economics
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coexisting, and economic systems as evolving and changing over time. They went
beyond statements of fact to explore signals of direction. Like the physical sciences in
which all physical laws continue to be obeyed, new economic systems need to be
complex systems that are “self-organized structures that absorb and dissipate energy”
while at the same time obeying some “simple behavioural rules in time and space”
(Foster, 2005, p. 1).
Based on the assumptions of the pioneers of the science of economics, it is
possible to classify the statements, thoughts, and information formed at the atomic or
macro level that move through the ether into four broad categories: 1) Facts influenced by
values; 2) Values influenced by facts; 3) Distinctive integration; 4) Full integration.

Facts Influenced by Values
An economist gives a statement of fact: “The unemployment rate is 9.6%.” This
statement is influenced by values because society has decided what facts are important to
measure and report. Schmalensee (1991) states: “Economic research, like research in any
scientific discipline, is driven in large part by an agenda that reflects the profession’s
shared sense of what problems are tractable and interesting at the time” (p. 115). The
statements of fact move through the values ether.

Values Influenced by Facts
Society identifies a problem: “The unemployment rate is too high.” This value
statement is influenced by facts because experience has shown that high unemployment
has negative consequences on both individuals and societies. The value statements move
through the values ether.
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Distinctive Integration
These types of statements, thoughts, and information use both fact and value
statements, but distinguish between the two. Value statement: “The unemployment rate
should be reduced to 3.5% for full-employment to be obtained.” Fact statement: “In the
past we have tried the following solutions with the following results.” These combined,
yet distinctive fact and value statements move through the ether.

Full Integration
This category is where most decisions and actions occur. Legislators use the art of
economics to prescribe solutions to lower the unemployment rate based on an integration
of facts and values: “To lower unemployment we will increase government spending.”
The policies move through the ether and stimulate more facts based on values, values
based on facts, and distinctive integration of the two leading to more decisions using full
integration.
Figure 1 on the following page represents a potential ‘New Science’ ValueInclusive Model of Economic Decision-Making that positions the four classifications of
statements, thoughts, and information within the values ether. The arrows indicate that
they move through the values ether both influencing and being influenced by each other
and the collective values ether.
Role of Relationships, Cooperation, and the Invisible Hand

Throughout time the four types of statements move through the values ether,
conditioning decisions and being conditioned by them. Over time, the values in the ether
evolve and some are lost. Within the ether resides the gravitational pull of relationships
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and cooperation that serves as the force that keeps us interconnected and dependent in our
decision-making while shaping the values ether and being shaped by it. On the edge of
this “Economic Universe” is the invisible hand that pushes and shapes the everexpanding universe while containing it within a framework of self-organization. The
model is both descriptive and predictive of a menu of outcomes.
Figure 2.1. Bell’s ‘New Science’ Value-Inclusive Model of Economic Decision-Making
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The incorporation of facts and values (including their distinction and integration) as well
as relationships, cooperation, and the invisible hand results in what Sen (1994) describes
as “menu-dependent” outcomes that go beyond rational self-interest (utility).
The payoff function in a menu-dependent system does not only include the actual
outcomes that emerge, but also the set of alternative outcomes (“the opportunity set” or
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“the menu”) that the individual determines they can choose by executing different
strategies. This menu of outcomes (or signals of direction) includes considerations of
how others will behave thereby creating multiple strategies. The actions of others [and
presumably value and cooperation considerations] may reduce the opportunity or menu
set over time moving the individual to a decision (Sen, 1994, p. 385). The invisible hand
can also play a part by changing overall environmental factors that can impact decisionmaking (See Figure 1, above).
Final Thoughts On The ‘New Science’ Model
The mid-nineteenth century language of “facts” within the scientific
discipline moved the science of economics to a mechanical-mathematical method of
economic analysis based on the assumption of individual rational actors in
economic decision-making. The classical scientific language of “facts” and
rationality required the removal of the consideration of values, relationships, and
cooperation in decision-making. Consideration of the “unseen” was believed to be
irrational. A forced separation of positive from normative statements was also
required resulting in an assumption that what “ought” to be could not be derived
from what “is.” As the assumption of rational actors became problematic, Keynes’
theories led to the separation of micro and macroeconomics with measurement of
economic behavior focused at the aggregate level. This approach minimized the
impact of individual actors, while maintaining the assumption of rationality within
the system.
The early twentieth-century brought changes in the language of science as
scientists began exploring areas that no longer fit nicely within the confines of the
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fact based, classical language of science. The science of economics, however, has
been slow to move toward a more dynamic approach to decision-making. The
model proposed in this paper attempts to return the description of economic
decision-making to a holistic approach incorporating facts and values, the positive
and normative, relationships and cooperation, and the micro and macro level
consistent with the pioneers of economic thought. At the same time the proposed
model attempts to incorporate the language and concepts associated with the
complex systems approach of the “new science.”
While the model is descriptive in nature, it has the predicative potential to
establish a menu of alternative outcomes (the opportunity set) based on a perceived set of
strategies (or signals of direction). The strategies (and the corresponding alternative
outcomes) will become increasingly limited over time based on the actions of others. The
proposed model is applicable to both micro and macro level decisions and incorporates
the dynamic nature of decision-making influenced by facts, values, relationships,
cooperation, and learning as well as their relativity to one another2.

Alternative Models and Theories of Value-Inclusive Economic Decision-Making
Suramaniam’s Fact/Value Distinction
While few models exist that attempt to integrate facts and values in a universal
decision-making model, Subramaniam (1963) does provide on alternative. In an effort to
avoid the fact/value dichotomy, his model includes values but does incorporate a
fact/value distinction. His purpose for establishing a distinction is to retain the concept of

2

Note: This is the end of the previously published work.
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rationality. In fact, he suggests incorporating values makes his model an example of a
“perfect rational decision” (p. 236).
In Subramaniam’s (1963) model (See Figure 2.2, following page) individuals
begin by recalling all primary values that are relevant to the situation. The next step is to
gather all relevant facts.
Figure 2.2. Subramaniam’s (1963) Diagram of a Model of a Perfect Rational Decision
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This process of alternating between gathering relevant values and relevant facts continues
until the moment of choice. The consequence of the choice moves into the future and
informs relevant facts and values in the next decision, unless the choice is determined
irrelevant for future decisions. While this model is a viable alternative, the constant
distinction of facts and values has not held up over time.
As an example we have seen how marketing, in its evolution to the relationship
era, has started to incorporate facts, values, and emotions into consumer decision-making.
(Bell, 2011a; Kotler, Kartajaya, & Setiawan, 2010; Peter & Olson, 2010). We’ve learned
that multiple decision-making factors can exist either sequentially (distinctive) or
simultaneously (integrated) (Bell, 2011a; Carrera & Oceja, 2007; Taylor, 2009).
Microeconomic consumer decisions are not made based on the distinction of facts and
values resulting in rational choices made by rational actors, but on the integration of
multiple cues sometimes resulting in less than rational behavior in the classic sense.
While distinction can exist at times it is integration that leads to decisions (Bell, 2011a;
Ramanathan & Shiv, 2001).

The Moral/Non-Moral Normative Judgment Distinction
Huei-Chun Su (2010) explores the dichotomous distinction of positive and
normative economics as discussed by David Colander (2001), John Stuart Mill (1963),
and British economist (and father of John Maynard Keynes) John Neville Keynes (1917).
There is a place for a positive/normative distinction as described by Colander, however,
if the analysis of economic issues resulting in applied policies is to be complete, the art of
economics integrating the positive and normative approaches must be included.
Su (2010) compares Mill’s proposed distinction between science and art, Keynes’
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insistence on the use of a distinct positive science in economic decision making,
Friedman’s (1966) concerns that objectivity through positive economics alone is difficult
as economics studies the “interrelations of human beings” (Friedman, 1966, p. 4), and
Colander’s three-fold approach that suggests that “when conducting applied policy
analysis, factors which are ruled out in positive economic analysis have to be added back
in. These include non-economic factors and the operational details of institutions” (Su,
2010, p. 2). In comparing the approaches she is looking for common ground and a way to
bridge the gaps. One troubling area she seeks to resolve is Colander’s assertion that
normative judgments are value judgments, which doesn’t allow for the removal of
subjectivity insisted on by the other scholars. Even Friedman (1966), who has concerns
about objectivity, only sought to revise positive economics to eliminate “fundamental
differences in basic values, differences about which men can ultimately fight” (p. 5).
To attempt to solve this problem Su (2010) proposes the integration of the
positive and normative, but with a distinction between moral normative judgments and
non-moral normative judgments with the former occurring rarely. While she puts this
forth as her proposal to solve the conflicts between the philosophies, the original concept
of a moral/non-moral distinction in normative judgment comes from Frankena (1973).
She borrows from Frankena (1963) when she defines moral values as “not about actions
or kinds of action, but about persons, motives, intentions, traits of character, and the like,
and we say of them that they are morally good, bad, virtuous, vicious…and so on”
(Frankena, 1963, p. 8; Su, 2010, p. 24). She describes non-moral judgments as
“predominantly determined by judgments based on the knowledge of facts and scientific
theories, not moral values or rules” (Su, 2010, p. 24). Table 2.1 on the following page

VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING

35

from Frankena (1973) provides examples of the distinction he has prescribed. While Su
(2010) and Frankena’s (1973) normative judgment distinction has merit, the theory still
seeks to minimize the impact of values on the analysis and decision-making process.

The Normative-Affective Approach
Amitai Etzioni (1988) proposes not only an integration of normative-affective
factors (emotions and values) into neoclassical economic models, but that often logicalempirical factors (the basis of rational decision-making) are not used at all in economic
decision-making. One problem the author notes with observing and modeling the
prominence of emotions and values in decision-making is that once the decisions are
made “Normative-affective (N/A) factors are subject to logical-empirical (L/E) research
by observers, but those actors who make them draw on value-commitments and
emotional involvements, not information or reason” (p. 126). As a result the distinct
combination of N/A and L/E is not adequately measured or known.

Table 2.1
Adapted from William K. Frankena’s Kinds of Normative Judgments from Ethics (1973)

Kinds of Normative Judgments
Ethical or moral judgments proper:
Judgments of moral obligation
(deontic judgments):

Judgments of moral value
(aretaic judgments):

Nonmoral normative judgments:
Judgments of nonmoral value:

Judgments of nonmoral
obligation:

Particular, e.g.
(assuming
terms are used
in their moral
senses),

General, e.g.,

Particular, e.g.,

General, e.g.,

Particular, e.g.,

General, e.g.,

Particular, e.g.,

General, e.g.,

a. We ought to
keep our
agreements.

a. My
grandfather was
a good man.

a. Benevolence is a
virtue.

a. That is a good
car.

a. Pleasure is good in
itself.

a. You ought
to buy a new
suit.

a. I ought not to
escape from
prison now.

b. Love is the
fulfillment of
the moral law.

b. Xavier was a
saint.

b. Jealousy is an
ignoble motive.

b. Miniver
Cheevy did not
have a very good
life.

b. Democracy is the
best form of
government.

a. In building
a bookcase
one should use
nails, not
Scotch tape.

b. You should
become a
missionary.

c. All men have
a right to
freedom.

c. What he did
was wrong.

c. He is
responsible for
what he did.
d. You deserve
to be punished.
e. Her character
is admirable.
f. His motive
was good.

c. The man who can
forgive such
carelessness is a saint.
d. The good man does
not cheat or steal.

b. You just
have to go to
that concert.

b. The right
thing to do on
fourth down
with thirteen
yards to go is
to punt.
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While economists might be concerned this approach leads to ‘irrationality’ Etzioni and
others warn not to confuse ‘irrationality’ with ‘nonrationality’. As Gigerenzer (2001)
states, “The term ‘nonrational’ denotes a heterogeneous class of theories of decisionmaking designed to overcome problems with traditional ‘rational’ theories” (p. 3304).
Yet, the decisions that are made remain completely rational for the individual decisionmaker based on their decision criteria regardless of whether they are the traditional utility
maximizing, cost/benefit factors or emotional/value factors. Etzioni argues the
normative-affective approach is nonrational, while demonstrating rational characteristics
at the same time simply through a different process of decision-making.
The author believes N/A factors serve as the baseline for decision-making and
should therefore be the primary level of analysis with L/E factors added in later. Etzioni
(1988) asserts:
…normative-affective factors shape to a significant extent decisionmaking, to the extent it takes place, the information gathered, the ways it
is processed, the inferences that are drawn, the opinions that are being
considered, and those that are finally chosen. (p. 127)
The purpose of Etzioni’s model is to stay closer to the neoclassical model
of economic decision-making than models of moral decision-making proposed by
others (see Latane & Darley, 1970; Schwartz, 1970; Simmons, Klein & Simmons,
1977). All of these theories assume that other emotional and value factors
influence decision making, but Etzioni’s approach shares characteristics of
Aristotle’s concept of hierarchy (Yuengert, 2000) with the N/A coming before the
L/E. This differs from Bell (2011b) who allows the N/A and L/E to be present at
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In Etzioni’s (1988) model the N/A factors influence decision-making by
excluding options that never make it to L/E analysis (i.e. we don’t consider
murdering our competition) or often excluding L/E considerations completely (i.e.
we don’t go beyond N/A when deciding to donate a kidney to a family member).
N/A factors also “load” facts with “interpretation, and inferences drawn with
nonlogical and nonempirical ‘weights’…that ranks options in ways that differ
from their L/E standing” (p.132). Anyone who has been “in love” has probably
observed this in his or her own decision-making.
Intrusion is another factor that often gives N/A factors prominence over
L/E factors in Etzioni’s model. He states that “…L/E considerations require
completing a sequence that involves collecting facts, interpreting their meanings,
and drawing inferences leading one to favor one option over others” [emphasis in
the original] (1988, p. 132). However, N/A factors can interrupt the L/E
considerations causing individuals to skip steps, under analyze information, or
inadequately complete them. Completing the sequence of L/E considerations
requires a great deal of discipline, self-awareness, and a high level of attention
and concentration. Similar to Simon’s (1991) concept of bounded rationality, the
limitations of our cognitive processes cause us to take shortcuts or get tunnel
vision leading to N/A factors taking over. This is consistent with the bounded
rationality problems discussed by other scholars concerned with the behavioral
aspects of decision-making (see Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982;
Posavac, Kardes, & Brakus, 2010; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Etzioni (1988)
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argues this occurs because “L/E thinking is conducted ‘vertically’, in sequences,
[and] N/A ‘considerations’ [use] ‘lateral thinking’” (p.133).
In short, Etzioni (1988) does not believe rationality is short-circuited in
this N/A hierarchical model; it simply helps in the decision-making process. To
put it in the language of Sen (1994) and Bell (2011b) N/A factors help establish a
menu of choices by excluding options. These choices are then analyzed using L/E
factors and a decision is made. Sometimes there can be negative consequences
(i.e. tunnel vision or ineffective shortcuts), but overall serves as a positive method
of meeting the multiple ‘nonrational’ needs of individual decision makers.
Specifically the author views Pieters and Van Raaij’s (1987) four functions of
affect as having positive impacts on decision-making. They include the
interpretation and organization of information, the mobilization and allocation of
resources, sensation seeking (when bored) and avoiding (when stressed), and by
providing a means of communicating feelings and preferences.

Behavioral Economics/Finance
The field of behavioral economics/finance is one area of decision-making that
deserves consideration in the discussion of ‘nonrational’ economic decision-making
models. This field deals with issues like biases (actor/observer, status quo, confirmation,
not invented here, availability, and short-term), and individuals’ propensity to engage in
herding behavior, use heuristics or rules of thumb, be overconfident, and a tendency to be
loss averse (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). The authors suggest these biases can sometimes be
overcome by choice architecture or “nudges” that move people toward the decision that is
in their (rational) best interest. For example, to get people to save for retirement,
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employers can set up defined contribution plans so that individuals must opt-out rather
than opt-in to the plan as status quo biases lead people to keep the default option. Thaler
(1988) has also explored the behavioral aspects of cooperation (as has Sen, 1977; 1994)
in economic decision-making.
Becker (1968) has also done some interesting work in behavioral economics. He
treated crime and punishment as a constrained optimization problem to minimize the
social costs of crime. He found the optimal solution was to minimize monitoring or
surveillance and maximize fines. How punishment structures are designed impacts
decisions about the allocation of time between crime and legitimate employment. In other
words, creating behavioral structures in which “crime does not pay” seems to have the
greatest social benefit. This includes higher fines or greater punishment for crimes with
lower elasticities.
While Simon’s (1991) bounded rationality has previously been mentioned,
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory uses cognitive psychology to explain
why rational decision-making (specifically expected utility theory) is not representative
of how individuals make decisions under risk. Like Etzioni (1988), prospect theory is
hierarchical in nature with people first editing and then evaluating based on utility.
During the editing process individuals use a variety of means to “rank” the prospective
decisions leaving them with a smaller set from which to choose. Unlike Etzioni, prospect
theory does not necessarily insist emotions and values drive the editing process, although
they may be a part of it. The theory also asserts that individuals are more likely to assign
utility value based on loss aversion and relative gains. In other words, they try to
minimize losses rather than maximize gains. Their decisions are also considered subject
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to intransitivity as they are based on the relative preferences between pairs of options.
This is different from the expected utility theory of rational decision-making models in
which absolute wealth (or gain maximization) is the most important factor and it is
assumed that all information is analyzed to reach the rational decision. Dan Ariely (2008)
provides evidence in his book Predictably Irrational that supports many of the behavioral
aspects discussed here. These include an individual’s propensity to regard their
environment and decisions in terms of their relation to others, asymmetric dominance
effects, anchoring, ignoring opportunity costs, and the role of social norms, emotions,
expectations, and self-control in decision-making.

Neuroeconomics
The emerging field of neuroeconomics is attempting to determine all the different
ways the brain drives decision-making. Neuroeconomics is combining behavioral
economics with neuroscience, cognitive and social psychology, and other experimental
methods to understand more about how individuals make economic decisions and how
they inform the other decisions in our lives. The field seeks to determine what variables
the brain computes to make economic decisions, how the underlying neurobiology helps
and constrains decision-making, and how it improves the understanding of behavior and
well-being in economic, political, clinical, legal, and business contexts among others
(Dayan, 2008; Fehr & Rangel, 2011).

Naturalistic Decision-Making
Another emerging field of decision-making is Naturalistic Decision-Making
(NDM). NDM attempts to determine how people use their expertise and other factors in
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actual decision-making as opposed to in a laboratory environment. It is primarily
concerned with proficient decision makers with relevant experience or knowledge in the
area in which they are making decisions. The need for “expertise” and observations in
actual decision-making situations makes this method of inquiry unique. However, while
the method is broad in its approach to factors leading to decisions, the need for expertise
makes it a more narrowly focused inquiry as individuals often make decisions in areas in
which they are not experts. In these cases the decision-making process might be quite
different (Lipshitz et al., 2001).
The method is relevant to this discussion because the characteristics of decisionmaking explored go beyond traditional rational methods. One characteristic is
considering the cognitive processes of proficient decision makers. NDM also considers
how well experts match decision actions with situations. For example, experts often
quickly screen out most options by comparing them against a standard for the situation
rather than compared to one another. This includes an analysis of an option’s
compatibility with a decision-makers values, rather than just its relative merits (Beach,
1990; Lipshitz et al., 2001). Unlike some other approaches, NDM also believes “that
‘ought’ cannot be divorced from ‘is’: prescriptions which are optimal in some formal
sense but which cannot be implemented are worthless” (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, &
Salas, 2001, p.335). In other words, practical application is necessary to justify decisionmaking theory.
Other ‘Nonrational’ Theories and Models
The purpose of this portion of the literature review was to discuss the nonrational
theories that attempt to overcome some of problems associated with assumptions of
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rationality in economic (macro and micro) decision-making models. As the scope of this
research does not allow for an in-depth discussion of all scholarly thought on nonrational
theories, some of the theories/models that most closely align with existing classical,
neoclassical, and contemporary economic thought have been highlighted. The goal is to
add layers of analysis on top of rational decision-making models and consider options
that will enhance existing theory.
A second goal is to provide evidence of scholarly thought on the role of decision
factors like values, emotions, learning, concern for others, culture, and the impact of
individuals in economic decision-making. With that in mind, there are other decisionmaking theories that have not been discussed in detail here, but may be drawn from in
later analysis. Aspects of many of these theories can be seen in several of the models and
theories already discussed.

Final Thoughts On Value Inclusive Economic Decision-Making Models
While Bell’s (2011b) model draws heavily from the classical economic literature
and even physics, the fields of ethics, psychology, behavioral economics/finance,
neuroeconomics, and naturalistic decision-making all offer insights into the ‘nonrational’
models of economic decision-making. We see recurring themes of relativity, complex
systems, concern for others, bounded rationality, behavioral factors, natural or organic
models, and a lack of dichotomy between the positive/normative and fact/value (although
distinction remains applicable at times).
Assuming a role for values in economic decision-making, the following section
explores two questions:
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1) How are individual values that go into our microeconomic decision-making
formed?
2) In what ways do we apply those values in microeconomic organizational
decisions?

Value-Inclusive Microeconomic Decision-Making

If we are going to understand the role of values in microeconomic decisionmaking, it will be necessary to explore how values are developed and how they might be
relevant in the business environment. In this section some notable theories associated
with the development of individual values will be discussed. In addition, studies that
indicate how personal values impact organizational decision-making at the
microeconomic level will be considered in the final portion of the literature review.

Individual Value Development

To be inclusive of values in economic decision-making, it will be necessary to
define individual values and how they are formed. Rokeach (1968) defines values, “as
abstract ideals, positive or negative, not tied to any specific object or situation,
representing a person’s beliefs about modes of conduct…” (p. 124). He believes these
values guide individual actions. Personal values are those values that an individual is
committed to and that influence behavior and guide the actions of the individual (Kaushal
& Janjhua, 2011; Theordoron & Achilles, 1969). Consistent with Bell’s (2011b),
Etzioni’s (1988), Huei-Chun Su’s (2010), and Subramaniam’s (1963), and models
described above, Shalom H. Schwartz (1992) views values as criteria in decision-making
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(to both select and justify actions) and not just descriptions inherent in individuals.
People use values to “select and justify actions and to evaluate people (including the self)
and events” (Schwartz, 1992, p.1). He has also demonstrated that values can be impacted
by social structure like education, age, gender and occupation as well as unique life
experiences. Personal values influence individual’s ideologies, attitudes, and actions
across cultures.

Kohlberg and Value Development
Lawrence Kohlberg has conducted extensive research on whether the moral
values of individuals have the ability to develop over time. Based on his research, he
developed what he describes as “a culturally universal invariant sequence of stages of
moral development” (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 630). His model consists of six stages within
three levels of development
The following is adapted from Kohlberg’s (1973) description of the model:
I. Preconventional level
At this level an individual is concerned with cultural rules, good and bad, right or
wrong. Individuals associate these rules and labels in terms of consequences like
punishment, reward, or exchange of favor.
Stage 1 is a punishment-and-obedience orientation. Individuals are not concerned with
their own meaning of value, but obey to avoid unpleasant consequences.
Stage 2 is the instrumental-relativist orientation. In this stage individuals take actions
that satisfy their own needs while occasionally satisfying the needs of others.
Reciprocity is simply a way to ensure you can continue to get what you want. The
concept of fairness comes into play, but only in a very pragmatic way. For example, a
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child might want to make sure his sister is not getting a bigger piece of cake than he is.
II. Conventional Level
At this level individuals become concerned with maintaining the expectations of their
family, group, or nation. These expectations are considered valuable on their own and
are considered by choice rather than out of concern for consequences. Individuals
desire to maintain, support, and justify the order of the group. The do not desire to
simply conform, but wish to identify with the group.
Stage 3 is referred to as the interpersonal concordance or “good boy—nice girl”
orientation. Individuals become aware that good behavior is what pleases others and is
approved by them. Individuals will try to conform to their perceived stereotypes of the
group. You earn approval by being nice and behavior is often judged by intention.
Stage 4 is the “law and order” stage. Maintaining the social order through authority and
fixed rules is important. The correct way to maintain social order in this stage is
through doing one’s duty and showing respect for authority for its own sake.
III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level
At this level individuals have formed their own moral values and principles. These
values and principles are not a part of the individual’s identification with the group, but
stand on their own validity.
Stage 5 is the social-contract legalistic orientation. This orientation generally comes
with utilitarian overtones. Right actions are framed within the context of individual
rights and standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the society
as a whole. The relativism of personal values and opinions is recognized and
procedures for reaching consensus are established. The American government and
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constitution are based on this form of morality as rational considerations of social
utility are applied that not only emphasize the legal point of view, but also the
possibility of changing the law. This is different from Stage 4 where the rules are fixed.
Stage 6 is the universal-ethical-principle orientation. At this stage universal principles
of justice, the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and respect for the dignity of
people as individuals become guiding, self-chosen principles. The rules that guide the
individual are abstract and ethical, and not absolute.
Kohlberg (1973) argues that not only does our morality develop over time, but our
logic does as well. He describes this as a transformational process that makes us better
decision-makers over time. The theory shares the hierarchical characteristics of the
models of decision-making described earlier (Rest, 1973). His final stage is closely
aligned with the theory of justice as described by John Rawls (1971). Kohlberg’s model
seeks to use an interdisciplinary approach that fuses the theories of moral philosophy set
forth by Rawls and Jean Piaget (Rest et al., 2000). It combines the inherent morality and
justice seeking of Rawls (1971) with the genetic epistemology approach of Piaget that
assumes the development of moral judgment with age (Piaget, 1932/1997).

The Neo-Kohlbergian Perspective
While some scholars agree with Kohlberg’s approach, there were many who do
not. As a result, a Neo-Kohlbergian perspective emerged. Bebeau, Narvaez, Rest, &
Thoma (1999) believed Kohlberg’s theory had merit, but required some modifications.
They believed several of Kohlberg’s core ideas required revisiting; specifically his
emphasis on cognition, individuals self-constructing categories of morality (like justice,
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duty, rights and social order), that one set of moral concepts was more developed and
“better” than others, and the “macromoral” focus on the formal structures of society in
the form of laws, roles, institutions, and general practices.
The authors first propose a distinction between and recognition of macromorality
(as described above) and micromorality that deals with personal interactions, how we
treat people, and “generally acting in a decent, responsible, empathic way in one’s daily
dealings with others” (Bebeau, et al., 1999, p. 2). They further describe the distinction
between macromorality and micromorality as follows:
In micromoral issues, what is praiseworthy is characterized in terms of
unswerving loyalty, dedication, and partisan caring to special others…in
macormorality, the praiseworthy response is characterized in terms of
impartiality and acting on principle, instead of partisanship, favoritism, or
tribalism. Both macro- and micromorality concern ways of constructing
and enriching the web of relationship’s—one through the structures of
society, and the other through personal face-to-face relationships. (p. 3)
While Bebeau, et al. (1999) see room for both micro- and macromorality to
coexist, they believe both Kohlberg and the Neo-Kohlbergian approach are better at
measuring the macromoral. This is consistent with J. N. Keynes (1917) and J. M. Keynes
(1936) need to isolate macro factors from micro factors for ease of analysis in economic
decision-making. This is a limitation of both approaches because it requires a high level
of abstract thinking that doesn’t apply well to individual decisions. Most individuals
don’t engage in abstract, philosophical thought prior to making a decision. Factors like
personal and immediate group values, relationships, emotions, behavioral, and other
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‘non-rational’ factors as described in the economic decision-making models in this paper
demonstrate the more unconscious and automatic processes individuals utilize.
Naturalistic decision-making research supports Bebeau’s assertions as it has finds the
complexity of the decision-making process under uncertainty causes us to match
responses to cues from the situation or environment that often rely on informal reasoning.
Neo-Kohlbergians also recognize the potential for conflict between the micro- and
macromoral considerations and therefore justify the macromoral limitation as preferable
because the ultimate goal should be for the betterment of society through impartiality,
fairness, and justice. As a result the Neo-Kohlbergian approach carries forward the
Rawlian characteristics of the original theory. Bell’s (2011b) approach to economic
decision-making attempts to combine the micro and macro into one model that
incorporates both. In her model the values ether both shapes and is shaped by both microand macro-level values with the superadditivity of micro-level values influencing and
being influenced by the macro-level.
The Neo-Kohlbergian perspective also argues against a stair-step approach to
moral development as proposed by Kohlberg (1971) and Piaget (1932/1997). Instead they
argue for gradual shifting toward the use of higher forms of thinking that are not tied in to
age or hard stages of development. They also reject the notion that advanced moral
thinking is the exclusive result of individual cognitions uninfluenced by other people and
society. However, it does retain the assumption of rationality (Narvaez, 2005). Bell’s
(2011b) model is consistent with this approach as it attempts to incorporate factors like
relationships and cooperation as presented by Sen (1994; 2004) as well as society, but
does remove the assumption of rationality in its classic definition of purely self-interested
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utility maximization based on cost/benefit analysis. Instead rationality includes multiple
interests including commitment that make multiple decisions equally rational, but for
different reasons for different people (Bell, 2011b; Sen, 2005).
To replace stage theory, Bebeau, et al. (1999) use schema theory to determine
moral development. They use the Defining Issues Test (DIT) to activate and assess moral
judgment. The purpose is to determine which schemas an individual brings to a task
when making a decision. While they do not fit neatly into “stages” they do determine
what set of schemas an individual is using in decision-making. This set of schemas has
proven effective in determining the level of moral thinking an individual is using
(Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al., 2000). These schemas already exist in the individual’s head
or long term memory and are presumed to structure and guide people’s moral thinking
(Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). This shift from stage theory to schema theory
is the most significant contribution of the Neo-Kohlbergian school and attempts to bridge
the gap between cognitive science and moral psychology. It also seeks to move the theory
beyond the exclusive moral judgment approach of Kohlberg and incorporate moral
sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral action (Narvaez, 2005).

Social Learning Theory
The concept of social learning theory could easily have been included in the
decision-making models and theories portion of this paper as well as this section on how
individual values are formed. I have chosen to put it here as Bandura (Bandura, 1977;
Wood & Bandura, 1989) first considers how values are formed and then how they are
utilized. Applications of the theory will be described in more detail in the following
section. Social learning theory was developed by Albert Bandura (see Bandura, 1977) in
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response to what he saw as shortcomings in Miller and Dollard’s (1941) concepts of
modeling in Social Learning and Imitation. Bandura (2007) summarizes Miller and
Dollard’s concept of modeling as follows: “A model provides a social cue, the observer
performs a matching response, and its reinforcement strengthens the tendency to behave
imitatively” (p. 55). His concern was that in real life we don’t simply mimic specific acts
or wholly incorporate the personality patterns of another person (the model). Instead, he
saw observational learning as selectively and conditionally manifesting characteristics of
the model. He saw the process of social modeling as having a cognitive component and
not simply mirroring others (Bandura, 2007). He also rejected the traditional assumptions
of behaviorists, which emphasize environmental determinism and minimize the
contributions of cognitive processes, especially cognitive mediators (Kytle, 1978). In
terms of values development, this makes it possible to cognitively reject the values of
your parents and selectively adopt the values you observe (and like) in others.
Bandura rejects the notion of human behavior being explained in terms of onesided determinism. He believes individuals learn within a social context, this includes
their values and beliefs about themselves and others (Bandura, 1977; Wood & Bandura,
1989). Rather than one-sided determinism, he proposes a triadic reciprocal determinist
approach for how we learn values and behaviors and achieve behavioral changes. In his
model of social learning theory, behavior, personal factors including cognition, and the
external environment “operate as interacting determinants that influence each other
bidirectionally…Because of the bidirectionality of influence, people are both product and
producers of their environments (Wood & Bandura, 1989, p. 362). This concept is similar
to Bell’s (2011b) model of the values ether in which current and past decisions, learning,
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relationships, and cooperation all influence each other bidirectionally, both influencing
and being influenced by one another. Like Bell, change and context become part of the
determinants of the description and explanation of how values are formed within
Bandura’s social learning theory (Lerner, 1990).
Social learning theory is based on the premise that information is conveyed by
models through direct observation called observational learning. In order for
observational learning to occur, four processes must be present:
1) Attentional processes—Attention determines what people selectively observe and
what information they extract from the modeled activity.
2) Cognititive representational processes—This is the process of actively retaining
information by transforming the observation into rules and conceptions.
3) Behavioral production process—In this process the rules and conceptions
previously determined are translated into courses of action.
4) Motivational processes—There are three primary types of motivators:
a. Direct—The action will produce valued outcomes.
b. Vicarious—People can be motivated by the successes of others who are
similar to themselves.
c. Self-produced—People generate self-evaluations that regulate which
observationally learned actions they will choose. Values and values
formation can be a significant influence in this area (Wood & Bandura,
1989).
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The social contexts and observational learning processes described by Bandera
can certainly influence individual value development. Individuals can also influence the
value of others through value modeling.

Final Thoughts on Individual Value Development
The three perspectives discussed here describing how individual values are
formed have several differences. Kohlberg’s approach is based on inherent morality and
the genetic epistemology of moral development that incorporates a significant role for
individual cognition. The Neo-Kohlbergian perspective seeks to add incorporate moral
sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral action to Kohlberg’s approach. The NeoKohlbergian school also recognizes that micro-moral factors are present and may conflict
with macro-moral factors, yet continues to evaluate the issue from a macro perspective
for ease of analysis as the good of society is viewed as the primary interest. The stair-step
approach to development, not recognizing the potential impact of micro-moral issues, and
one set of moral concepts being better than another are rejected and the roles of
individual cognition and self-constructing of morality are minimized in favor of a
“schema” approach in Neo-Kolberianism. While not specifically analyzed, the influences
of other people and society are recognized (Bebeau et al., 1999; Narvaez, 2005; Rest et
al., 2000).
Bandura’s (1977; Wood & Bandura, 1989) social learning theory sees a much
more active role for social context, learning, change, and observation resulting in a
cognitive process of selectively and conditionally adopting values within the value
development process. Bandura’s approach is similar to Schwartz (1970; 1992) who
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incorporates social structures like education, age, gender and occupation as well as
unique life experiences into the process of value development. These approaches are
much more holistic in their approach.
Bell’s (2011b) model more closely aligns with the approaches to value inclusive
decision-making and the formation of values suggested by Bandura (1977) and Schwartz
(1970; 1992). Bell’s model is based on the bidirectional influence of individuals and
society including concern for factors like relationships, cooperation, experience,
information, learning, complexity, and multiple equilibria. There is also a place for the
Neo-Kohlbergian (Bebeau et al., 1999, Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al, 2000) concept of
schemas in Bell’s model, but she would argue that there are both micro and macro
influences on those schemas, which may evolve over time. Overlaying the NeoKohlbergian and social learning approaches of value development with Bell’s (2011b)
model would result in the following revised model in Figure 2.3on the following page.
Even with their differences, there are some core similarities between the theories
of moral development. The first similarity is that morality and values do have a role in
decision-making and they do evolve over time. A second similarity is the involvement of
others either in our concern for others in our decision-making or the influences of others.
Even Kohlberg’s approach that is based strongly on an internal cognitive approach to
development does include the influence of others. For example, even in the Level 1,
Stage 1 punishment-and-obedience orientation, someone else is determining what is right,
what is wrong, and when an individual should be punished or rewarded.
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Figure 2.3. Bell’s ‘New Science’ Value-Inclusive Model of Economic Decision-Making
With Neo-Kohlbergian & Social Learning Values Development

The External
Environment

Values Schema
Ether

The External
Environment

Facts Influenced
By Values

Full
Integration

Relationships,
Cooperation &
Social Learning

Values Influenced
by Facts

Distinctive
Integration

The External
Environment

Values Schema
Ether

The External
Environment

Value-Inclusive Microeconomic Decision-Making in Organizations

If values are included in economic decision-making and individual values are
formed in a variety of ways, why should businesses and other organizations be concerned
with values? The most obvious reason is that individuals in organizations make
microeconomic decisions that can impact the entire organization. The values of
individuals in organizations can determine the values of organizations including the
ethical practices that make or break them. The ethics scandals that rocked companies like
Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom all involved the personal values of individuals within these
companies (McLean & Elkind, 2004). Behavior in an organization is a manifestation of
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attitudes and values. If behaviors and their actions are manifestations of values, then
values are both inferred from behavior and may predict behavior in organizations
(Churchman, 1961; Connor & Becker, 1975; England, 1967).
Studies have indicated that individuals may bring the personal values they use
routinely, to their decisions at work. Personal values that closely match organizational
values result in greater organizational commitment and are linked to variables like
absenteeism, turnover, job satisfaction, organizational citizenship, and job performance
(Finegan, 2000). In addition to organizational commitment, worker satisfaction is greater
when their values are congruent with those of their immediate supervisor (Jiang, Lin, &
Lin, 2010; Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989) . Values can also impact vocational choice
and the likelihood of rising to a leadership position (Finegan, 2000; Keltner, Langner, &
Allison, 2006; Palmer, 2000). Individual value characteristics like conscientiousness,
agreeableness, neuroticism, Machiavellianism, moral reasoning, and locus of control
along with moderating influences like the need for power and moral utilization all
influence ethical leadership (Brown & Trevino, 2006). Values are the “prime drivers of
personal, social, and professional choices” (Suar & Khuntia, 2010, p. 443).
Cultural and work contexts can also impact values and their use in business
decisions (Gamble & Gibson, 1999; Suar & Khuntia, 2010). Gamble and Gibson (1999)
found that the personal/cultural value of collectivism based on personal relationships
manifests itself at work with Chinese financial controllers. When making business
decisions, they did not attempt to meet objective performance criteria, but instead used
‘relationships’ and ‘organization’ considerations in decision-making. Cooperating with
peers and supporting supervisors had significant weight in decision-making. Work values
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emerge from personal values because work values emerge from the projection of personal
values into the domain of work (Kaushal & Janjhua, 2011; Ros, Schwartz, & Surkis,
1999).
As important as value congruence is to organizational commitment and individual
performance, personal values also determine ethical practices at work. As Suar &
Khuntia (2010) state:
Irrespective of the type of organizations and age of managers, personal
values more potently and consistently decreased unethical practices and
increased work behavior compared to value congruence. Hiring managers
emphasizing personal values can demote unethical practices and promote
work behavior. (p. 443)
If we assume that Bandura (1977) is correct and individuals continue to develop
contextual values based on observational learning, organizational leaders are pivotal in
ensuring the ethical practices in business decision-making of subordinates. Leaders who
articulate their values and model ethical behavior can reduce unethical behavior and
interpersonal conflicts (Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012), make ethical
behaviors by subordinates a habit (Almeida, 2011), positively impact the personal values
of employees (Weiss, 1978), create more value for customers through market orientation
(Lam, Kraus, & Ahearne, 2010), and demonstrate justice and care during a corporate
crisis (Simola, 2003). They help form the complex mental models that all members of the
organization use in the decision-making process (Courtney, 2001; Goel, Johnson,
Junglas, & Ives, 2010) and influence the meanings individuals give to experiences in the
sensemaking process in organizations (Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005).
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Of course this is a double edged sword and leaders like John Gutfreund at
Salomon Brothers and Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling at Enron who express negative values
and model unethical behavior will most likely lead observers to either leave the company
or adopt the unethical practices embedded in the culture (Sims & Brinkmann, 2002;
McLean & Elkind, 2004). As a result, organizations have a vested interest in
understanding the role of values in organizational decision-making and how those values
and the resulting behaviors are formed.
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Chapter 3
Methods

The purpose of this study was to identify the relationships between the personal
values that individuals in a group assign to decision considerations and the future
decisions of those individual group members. The role reflecting on and sharing values
plays in our development of decision-making schemas, and whether these factors can
interrupt existing, unconscious decision-making schemas will be explored. A quasiexperimental pretest/posttest design with 5 groups was utilized. A quasi-experimental
design that includes multiple groups was selected to minimize certain internal validity
threats to single group models including history, maturation, selection, mortality, and
experimenter biases. The design of the experiment also helped minimize some of these
threats. For example, the history, maturation, and mortality threats were minimized
because the pretest, treatment, and posttest all occurred during the same class period over
approximately 1 1/2 hours.

Sample
Participants were selected using convenience sampling from 5 undergraduate
business classes with 3 at the Mat-Su College of the University of Alaska Anchorage
(MSC) and 2 at Colorado State University (CSU). The MSC groups were between 13 and
22 students and the 2 CSU groups ranged from 35 to 45 students. While convenience
sampling was utilized to choose the classes to participate, the students had randomly selfselected to enroll in the programs and courses with no influence from the researcher.
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These two campuses provide very different environments and student populations.
CSU is a large research university with approximately 23,000 students in Fort Collins,
CO (U.S. News & World Report, 2013). While not an “urban” campus the population of
the city is approximately 147,000 and the city website describes Fort Collins as “rapidly
urbanizing”. CSU is also a “selective” college (75.9% accepted) with specific and
rigorous admission requirements that must be met by all students.
MSC is a small satellite “teaching” campus of the University of Alaska
Anchorage with a 2012/2013 academic year student population of approximately 1,900.
The campus is located on the border of the towns of Palmer and Wasilla, Alaska that
have a combined population of approximately 14,214. MSC draws students from the
greater Mat-Su Borough with a population of approximately 92,000 in an area the size of
the state of West Virginia. The campus offers Associate Degrees and coursework leading
to Bachelor’s degrees at the University of Alaska Anchorage. MSC is an “open
enrollment” campus meaning there are no admission requirements other than taking the
university placement tests for math and English. Of those students enrolled in the
College, approximately 25% do not have college level math or English skills and are
required to take developmental classes.
One reason for choosing classes is that Bell’s (2011b) model and other scholars
including Bandura (1977) and Sen (1994) suggest relationships may play a role in the
formation of values. Students in the same class have had an opportunity to form
relationships and ideas about one another that would be lost if the class members had
been separated and randomly assigned to groups. While this is only one type of
relationship, it serves as a control for this study and does not necessarily limit
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generalizability. Members of a class have a variety of levels of “closeness” with other
individuals in the class as we all do with the individuals we encounter on a daily basis.
This study is not designed to test level of relationship, only to choose groups in which
some relationship exists. Classes have the added benefit of being similar to work groups
in the business environment, which is the intended application of this study.
All subjects were adults and no members of vulnerable populations were utilized.

Instrumentation
Participants were given the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT2) as the pretest and
posttest. This test was originally developed by James R. Rest (1979) and later updated
and revised in the second version used here. Scored results are based on Kohlberg’s
(1973) Stages of Moral Development, but it is designed to test the unconscious schemas
consistent with the Neo-Kohlbergian perspective. The instrument has been used in over
400 published articles (Center for the Study of Ethical Development, 2012) many times
with university students (Cesur, S. & Topcu, M. S., 2010; Lies, J. M., Bock, T.,
Brandenberger, J., & Trozzolo, T. A., 2012; Pagano & DeBono, 2011; Woodward, Davis,
& Hodis, 2007) including at least one study specifically using business students (Lan,
Gowing, McMahon, Rieger & King, 2008). The DIT has proven to be very reliable with
Cronbach’s alpha ranging from the upper 0.70s to the low 0.80s over 25 years of data.
Test-retest results without interventions have proven to be about the same (Rest et al.,
2000). An example of the pre-test and post-test instrument are in Appendices A and B of
this document.
Participants were also given a list of values and anti-values to serve as prompts.
The value prompts were adapted from Schwartz’s (1992) list of universal values and
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motivational types of values. Schwartz’s values list was modified to include opposite
pairs or value/anti-value pairs (See Appendix C). For example, one of Schwartz values
was honesty; the value prompts for this study includes the matched pair of
honesty/dishonesty. The reason for this modification is that when participants are asked
to select a personal value they believe applies to a particular decision consideration, the
decision consideration might indicate a lack of the value of honesty. For example, if one
of the decision considerations participants are asked to assign a value to is: “To prevent
going to jail, I would lie,” this may indicate a lack of the honesty value. In this case the
value I might associate with this decision consideration is the anti-value of dishonesty.
Anti-values were developed from antonyms in The Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Thesaurus (2nd ed.).
Demographic information was collected including age, gender, time in business
cohort, years of full-time/part-time work experience outside the university, and number
of years in a leadership position in full-time/part-time work.
Students were also asked about their perceived use of values and ethical decisionmaking skills to determine their self-expectations. These questions were important
because expectations of self and others have been considered as possible motivations for
decision-making. While, this study explores whether the reflection on and sharing of
values impacts an individual’s decision-making, it is also important to capture selfexpectations about how individuals make decisions for future analysis. The two questions
that were asked included:
1. Do you consider your personal values when making work decisions?
Yes/No
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2. Do you consider yourself an ethical decision maker? Yes/No

Experimental Design and Procedures.
Design. As previously discussed this quasi-experimental study will use a
pretest/posttest design with multiple groups. While participants will not be randomly
assigned to groups students have randomly self-selected to be in the class and were not
placed in groups by the researcher. The experiment also requires students to be part of a
group or community within which they may have developed relationships. Using the
standard classic notation system the quasi-experimental design is as follows:
Test Groups:

O----------X----------O

Pretest. During the pretest, participants will be given the Defining Issues Test-2.
The researcher will give instructions and offer to answer any questions.
Treatment. The researcher will distribute the list of value/anti-value prompts and
give participants an opportunity to read the list and ask any clarifying questions. If
students ask questions about what a particular value means, the researcher will provide a
definition. All definitions of values will come directly from Schwartz’s (1992) definitions
included in his list on pages 61-62 of his study. Anti-value definitions will come from
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. (2008).
A list of the decision considerations participants were asked to rate in scenario 1
was distributed (See Appendix D). Participants were asked to assign the value they
believe most adequately reflected the personal value of an individual who would consider
that issue to be assigned “great” or “much” importance in the decision for that scenario.
Participant’s answers were collected and the researcher projected a word
document on the screen with each of the decision considerations from scenario 1. With
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the group, the researcher randomly selected 5 to 13 response sheets from students and
added the values the participants assigned to each of the decision considerations, creating
a values set for each issue. No discussion was allowed, but participants were given a few
minutes to review the information.
Posttest. The participants will retake all parts of the Defining Issues Test-2.

Pilot Test
The process and instruments were piloted tested with 30 undergraduate students
in an Introduction to Business class at the University of Alaska Anchorage, Mat-Su
Campus. Students found the DIT2 easy to understand, but somewhat time consuming.
The students also found the Value Prompts understandable and relevant to the decision
considerations. They had no additional suggestions for how instructions or the
instruments could be improved.
The original method called for all students’ responses to the values expressed on
Scenario 1 to be shared with the group. I found it to be very time consuming during the
pilot and noticed students starting to lose interest after awhile. As a result, I decided to
pull a random sample of 10 to share. The pilot took approximately 1½ hours, but I
believed I could reduce the time by 15 minutes with this modification. The time reduction
proved to be true for all but 1 of the participating groups.
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Data Analysis
As the DIT2 is a proprietary instrument owned by the University of Alabama,
responses were sent to UofA for scoring. The test results provided the following scores in
Table 2 on the following page. I completed statistical data analysis by group, school, and
for the data as a whole.
Table 3.1
DIT-2 Measured Scores
Stage 23 Score

Stage 4P Score

Personal Interest Schema Score: this score represents the proportion
of items selected that represents considerations from Stage 2 (focus on
the personal interest of the actor making the moral decisions) and Stage
3 (focus on maintaining friendships, good relationships, and approval).

Maintaining Norms Schema Score: this score represents the
proportion of items selected that represent consideration from Stage 4
(focus on maintaining the existing legal system, roles, and formal
organizational structure).
P Score
Postconventional Schema Score: this score represents the proportion
of items selected that represent considerations from Stage 5 (focus on
appealing to majority while maintaining minority rights) and Stage 6
(focus on appealing to intuitive moral principles or ideals).
N2 Score
New Index Score: this score represents the degree to which
Postconventional items are prioritized plus the degree to which
Personal interest items receive lower ratings than the Postconventional
items. This score is adjusted to have the same mean and standard
deviation as the P score to allow for comparisons.
U Score
Utilizer Score: This score represents the degree of match between
which items the participants rated as most important and what decision
participants say they would make in the moral dilemma.
Hum/Lib Score Humanitarian/Liberalism Score: this score represents the number of
reported decisions for the moral dilemmas that match those chosen by a
group of “experts” (professionals in the field of political science and
philosophy). Scores range from 0 to 5 out of the possible 5 moral
dilemma decisions that can match.
Cancer10
Religious Orthodoxy Score: this score represents the sum of the rated
importance and rank for one specific item from the Cancer moral
Score
dilemma that evokes the notion that only God can determine whether or
not someone should live or die.
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Antisocial Score: this score represents the degree to which items are
selected that represents considerations that reflect an anti-establishment
attitude. These considerations presuppose Stage 4, but fault the
establishment for being inconsistent with their purpose.
Meaningless Score: this score represents the degree to which the
survey results are meaningless. The higher the score the more
meaningless the individual survey results.

Note. Adapted from “Defining Issues Test-2: Spring 2009,” by Texas Tech University, 2009,
Retrieved from www.depts.ttu.edu/provost/qep/docs/DIT_Spring2009.pdf

The total respondents and number of valid responses were recorded. M scores
were checked and the scorer removed participants with high M scores from the study. M
scores measure the meaningless items and are a test for response validity. Bebeau and
Thoma (2003) describe these items as:
…items that contain unusual, pretentious words or complex syntax, but the
items aren’t meaningful to the dilemma. “M” items are ‘high sounding’
but deliberately designed to be meaningless. If a subject endorses too
many of these items (greater than 10), we assume that the subject is
responding to style of wording and syntax rather than to meaning, and
therefore we invalidate the protocol. (p. 7)
To determine if a change has occurred in the level of ethical decision-making
utilizing the DIT2, the relevant scores to consider are the P Score and the N2 Score. I also
included analysis of the Utilizer score as it has relevance to this study. While not
relevant to the study, I did analyze the results from Stage 23 and Stage 4P to look for any
anomalies or inconsistencies with the instrument norms. I found the pre- and post test
scores to be nearly identical with no statistically significant changes or unusual scores.
Descriptive statistics including mean, median, mode, skewness, and standard deviation
were calculated for both the pre- and posttest data. A t-Test (95% C.L.), and Pearson
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correlation were calculated and reported here for matched pairs of the Postconventional,
N2, and Utilizer scores.
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Chapter 4
Results

The primary purpose of this research is to explore the role reflecting on and
sharing values plays in our individual decision-making schemas in groups. Specifically to
answer the question: Can introducing values into decision considerations disrupt existing
unconscious schemas? To accomplish this goal, the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT2) was
used. It measures the unconscious values schemas individuals use in their decisionmaking that determine their level of ethical decision-making. It is important to note that
participants were not told the instrument measured ethical decision-making. They were
simply told the instrument measured how they make decisions. The brief activity in
which they were asked to determine the values associated with the decision
considerations in Scenario 1 was the first time a values frame was introduced in the
decision-making process.
There were a total of 135 participants in the experiments with 107 (79.26%)
complete matched pretest/posttest sets after scoring. Participants were removed from the
study if they did not have completed pre- or posttests, including incomplete demographic
information required by the scorer, or if they had “meaningless” scores higher than 10. A
significant portion of the participants removed from the study came from Group 4. The
group originally had 45 participants, but had 21 (47%) of participants removed due to one
of the reasons discussed above. Group 4 was unique in that the class period was only 50
minutes in length, whereas other groups used 1 1/4 to 1 1/2 hours to complete the
experiment. For many participants, 50 minutes was not enough time to complete the
experiment adequately as they had other classes to attend across a very large land grant
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university. However, some students did stay after the 50-minute class period to complete
their posttest. Incomplete or meaningless posttests were the primary reason for rejecting
participant responses in this case. This was not a reflection of the method, but the time
limitation available for participants.
All participants described themselves as ethical decision-makers, and only 3
participants reported they did not use their personal values when making work decisions.
No one was allowed to participate more than once even if they were in more than one of
the classes utilized. The experiment was conducted 5 times and information about the
groups is described below.
For those reporting demographic information for all participants the age range
was from 18 to 50 with a mean age of 24.5, median of 22, and a mode of 21. Sixty-five
(62%) participants were female and 40 (38%) were male. Seventy-four (71%) students
are “traditional” college age students (18 – 24) and 31 (30%) are “nontraditional” college
age students (25+). Of the scored participants reporting, 34 report a management major,
16 accounting majors, 13 dual majors in management and marketing, 8 hospitality
management majors, 4 computer science majors, 3 nursing majors, 3 logistics and supply
chain management majors, 3 marketing majors, 3 organization and innovation majors, 2
mechanical engineering majors, 2 dual majors in management and accounting, 2
computer information systems majors, and 1 major each in human resources, computer
information and office systems, human services, dental hygiene, business and music,
accounting and global logistics management, management and finance, management and
entrepreneurship, management and human resources, management and interior design,
and management and equine science.
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Group Descriptions - UAA Mat-Su College

Group 1
This group was a MSC lower division Microeconomics class and consisted of 13
participants resulting in 11 (85%) complete scored matched pretest/posttest pairs.
Computer problems during the completion of either a pre- or posttest resulted in
incomplete results in both cases. All scored participants are female, 2 are non-U.S.
citizens and 3 are non-native English speakers. Ages of the group range from 19 to 45
with a mean age of 27.36, median of 27, and a mode of 19. Five students (45%) are
“traditional” college age students (18-24) and 6 (55%) are “nontraditional” college age
students (25+). Of the scored participants reporting, 7 are accounting majors, 3 business
administration majors, and one mechanical engineering major.
The distribution of students reporting length of time as part of the cohort is on Table 4.1
on page 74
Due to the small class size, rather than taking a random sample of the values
students assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1, all student
responses were shared. The shared value set for each of the Scenario 1 decision
considerations for all groups is in Appendix E. Duplicate responses were removed from
the set.
Group 2
This group was a MSC lower division second semester Principles of Financial
Accounting class and consisted of 20 participants resulting in 20 (100%) complete scored
matched pretest/posttest pairs. Five scored participants are male and 15 are female, all are
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U.S. citizens and native English speakers. Ages of the group range from 18 to 48 with a
mean age of 29.3, median of 27, and a mode of 26. Five students (25%) are “traditional”
college age students (18-24) and 15 (75%) are “nontraditional” college age students
(25+). Of the scored participants reporting, 9 are accounting majors, 8 are business
administration/management majors, 1 human resources major, 1 computer information
and office systems/office administration major, 1 nursing major, and 1 double major in
accounting and global logistics management. The distribution of students reporting length
of time as part of the cohort is on Table 4.1 on page 74.
For this class a random sample of 10 student responses to the values students
assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were shared. Duplicate
responses were removed from the set.

Group 3
This group was a MSC lower division Supervision class and consisted of 19
participants resulting in 17 (89%) complete scored matched pretest/posttest pairs. Eleven
scored participants are male and 6 are female, all are U.S. citizens and 1 is a non-native
English speaker. For those reporting (16), ages of the group range from 19 to 50 with a
mean age of 25.93, median of 23.5, and a mode of 22. Eight students (50%) are
“traditional” college age students (18-24) and 8 (50%) are “nontraditional” college age
students (25+). Of the scored participants reporting, 4 are computer science majors, 3
logistics and supply chain management majors, 2 business management majors, 2 nursing
majors, 2 undecided, 1 human service major, 1 dental hygiene major, and 1 dual business
and music major. The distribution of students reporting length of time as part of the
cohort is on Table 4.1 on page 74.
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For this class a random sample of 5 student responses to the values students
assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were shared. Due to the time
constraints experienced with Groups 4 and 5 at CSU, a sample of 5 student responses was
chosen for those groups. I decided to choose only 5 from this group as well for
consistency with the CSU groups. Doing so still provided a variety of responses (see
Appendix E). Duplicate responses were removed from the set.

Group Descriptions - Colorado State University
Group 4
This group was a CSU upper division Human Resources class and consisted of 45
participants resulting in 24 (53%) complete scored matched pretest/posttest pairs. Of
those scored participants reporting (22), 10 are male and 12 are female, 1 is not a U.S.
citizens and 1 is a non-native English speaker. For those reporting (16), ages of the group
range from 20 to 36 with a mean age of 22.09, median of 21, and a mode of 21. Twenty
students (91%) are “traditional” college age students (18-24) and 2 (9%) are
“nontraditional” college age students (25+). Of the scored participants reporting, 16
report a business administration major (7 management, 2 computer information systems,
3 marketing, 3 organization and innovation management) and 8 are hospitality
management majors. The distribution of students reporting length of time as part of the
cohort is on Table 4.1 on page 74.
For this class a random sample of 5 student responses to the values students
assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were shared. Due to the time
constraints experienced with Groups 4 and 5 at CSU, a sample of 5 student responses to
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the values students assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were
shared (see Appendix E). Duplicate responses were removed from the set.
Group 5
This group was a CSU upper division Organizational Behavior and Leadership class and
consisted of 36 participants resulting in 35 (97%) complete scored matched
pretest/posttest pairs. Of those scored participants reporting (22), 14 are male and 21 are
female, 1 is not a U.S. citizens and 1 is a non-native English speaker. For those reporting
(16), ages of the group range from 20 to 24 with a mean age of 21.74, median of 22, and
a mode of 22. Thirty-five students (100%) are “traditional” college age students (18-24)
and none are “nontraditional” college age students (25+). Of the scored participants
reporting, 14 report a management major, 13 are management and marketing majors, 3
management and finance majors, 1 management and entrepreneurship major, 1
management and HR major, 2 management and accounting majors, 1 management and
interior design major, 1 management and equine science major, and 1 mechanical
engineering major. The distribution of students reporting length of time as part of the
cohort is on Table 4.1 on page 74.
For this class a random sample of 5 student responses to the values students
assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were shared. Due to the time
constraints experienced with Groups 4 and 5 at CSU, a sample of 5 student responses to
the values students assigned to each of the decision considerations in Scenario 1 were
shared (see Appendix E). Duplicate responses were removed from the set.
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Table 4.1 on the next page provides a summary of demographic information by
group.
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Table 4.1
Demographic Summary
Age
Group
1

Scored
Range
Participants
11
19-45

Traditional/NonGender
Traditional Student
Trad.
Nontrad. Female Male

Mean

Median

Mode

27.36

27

19

5(45%)

6(55%)

11

0

2

20

18-48

29.3

27

26

5(25%)

15(75%)

15

5

3

17

19-50

25.93

23.5

22

8(50%)

8(50%)

6

11

4

24

20-36

22.09

21

21

20(91%)

2(9%)

12

10

5

35

20-24

21.74

22

22

35(100%)

0(0%)

21

14
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Length of Time in Cohort
Table 4.2 below shows the time students reported being part of their cohort of
students. An explanation of how cohorts are defined in this context follows the table.
Table 4.2
Length of Time in Cohort
Group
1

2

3

4

5

Years
<1
1
2
3
4
>4
<1
1
2
3
4
>4
<1
1
2
3
4
>4
<1
1
2
3
4
>4
<1
1
2
3
4
>4

Frequency
1
3
4
1
1
1
7
5
4
4
0
0
4
6
4
2
1
0
0
2
5
10
0
0
3
0
5
5
9
2

While these students were not in traditional cohorts (i.e. moving through all their
classes together), they were part of lower or upper division groups. At MSC students are
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Freshman and Sophomores taking the same business classes and there is often only 1
section to choose from. CSU students were Juniors and Seniors and are taking many of
their upper division classes together. Most students also live on campus and so have
social relationships outside of class time with their classmates.

DIT2 Measured Scores Data

Again, the primary purpose of this research is to explore the role reflecting on and
sharing values plays in our individual decision-making schemas in groups. Specifically,
whether introducing values into decision considerations can disrupt existing unconscious
schemas. To accomplish this goal, the DIT2 was utilized to measure schema scores as
they relate to the level of ethical decision-making development. For purposes of this
research the following DIT-2 scores were analyzed:
1) Postconventional Schema Score (P Score). This score measures how much of
the decision-making process falls into the Stages 5 and 6 categories of Kohlberg’s
value development scale. As the description states, this is the Postconventional
stage of value development. An increase in score indicates an improvement
Postconventional ethical decision-making.
2) New Index Score (N2 Score). The N2 score is designed to measure: a) “The
degree to which Postconventional items are prioritized”, and b) “The degree to
which Personal interest items (lower stage items) receive lower ratings than the
ratings given to Postconventional items (higher stage items)” (Bebeau & Thoma,
2003, p. 19). It provides an overall level of value development, not just a schema
score. An increase in score indicates an improvement in Postconventional ethical
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decision-making and movement away from lower stage (Personal interest) ethical
decision-making.
3) Utilizer Score (U Score). This score “represents the degree of match between
items endorsed as most important and the action choice on that story” (Bebeau
and Thoma, 2003, p. 21). In other words, how well the participant selected a
menu of decision considerations that were directly related to their decision.
As the number of participants in all but one of the groups was less than 30, I have
decided to discuss the results by school and for all participants. I have looked at the
statistics at the group level and did not find any significant data that was inconsistent with
the school and all participant levels. For reference the N2 Score Descriptive statistics and
t-Test results by group are attached in Appendix F. While not relevant to the results being
reported in this study, the lower stage scores (Stage 23 and 4P Scores) were analyzed by
group, school, and all data to look for any abnormalities that might indicate students were
performing at a level lower than what would be consistent with their age group. No
abnormalities or significant pretest/posttest changes were observed. For reference,
descriptive and t-Test data for the Stage 23 and 4P Score is available in Appendix G.

MSC Scores
Postconventional schema score. Descriptive data for MSC is listed below.
Table 4.3
MSC Postconventional Schema Score Descriptive Statistics
Pscore Pre MSC
Mean
Standard Error
Median

Pscore Post MSC

30.25 Mean
1.854288684 Standard Error
30 Median

32.33333333
1.775855935
34
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Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

79

38 Mode
Standard
12.84688885 Deviation
165.0425532 Sample Variance
0.265591982 Kurtosis
0.370817737 Skewness
62 Range
4 Minimum
66 Maximum
1452 Sum
48 Count

36
12.30349083
151.3758865
0.109293307
0.180855038
58
6
64
1552
48

A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 below).
Figure 4.1. MSC PScore Prettest
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Figure 4.2. MSC PScore Posttest
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The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.75. A twotailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.01 and an observed t Stat of -1.64 suggesting
the 2.08-point increase in the mean values is not statistically significant. A two-tailed pvalue of 0.11 supports a failure to reject the null hypothesis for the MSC
Postconventional Schema Score.
N2 Index score. Descriptive data for MSC is listed on the next page.
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Table 4.4
MSC N2 Index Score Descriptive Statistics
N2 Score Pre MSC
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

N2 Score Post MSC

27.94360339
1.820240205
28.33984424
#N/A
12.61099407
159.0371714
-0.973468014
-0.189759437
50.39917637
1.662813234
52.06198961
1341.292962
48

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

32.26344346
2.080446036
34.93098236
#N/A
14.41375295
207.756274
-0.898486707
0.120923696
57.82962879
6.446759816
64.2763886
1548.645286
48

A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below).
Figure 4.3. MSC N2Score Pretest
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Figure 4.4. MSC N2Score Posttest
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The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.77. A twotailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.01 and an observed t Stat of -3.22 suggesting
the 4.32-point increase in the mean values is statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value
of 0.002 supports a rejection of the null hypothesis for the MSC New Index Score.
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Consistent with Cohen’s (1992) use of Pearson’s Correlation as a test of effect size, these
results indicate a large effect size.
Utilizer score. For the utilizer score n was reduced from 48 to 47. This is
because the data used to calculate the score is different from the other scores, and one
participant had incomplete data in this category. Descriptive data for MSC is listed
below.
Table 4.5
MSC Utilizer Score Descriptive Statistics
Utilizer Pre MSC
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.204736493
0.019693299
0.207656004
#N/A
0.135010456
0.018227823
0.723993139
0.144556954
0.542737284
0.080230729
0.462506555
9.622615184
47

Utilizer Post MSC
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.159430344
0.02151818
0.162821185
0
0.147521212
0.021762508
0.122321601
0.125507068
0.688368165
0.174471993
0.513896172
7.493226151
47

A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 on the next page).
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Figure 4.5. MSC Utilizer Pretest
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Figure 4.6 MSC Utilizer Posttest
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The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.74. A twotailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.01 and an observed t Stat of 3.05 suggesting
the 0.04-point decrease in the mean values is statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value
of 0.004 supports a rejection of the null hypothesis for the MSC Utilizer Score.
Consistent with Cohen’s (1992) use of Pearson’s Correlation as a test of effect size, these
results indicate a large effect size.

CSU Scores
Postconventional schema score. Descriptive data for CSU is listed below
Table 4.6
CSU Postconventional Schema Score Descriptive Statistics
Pscore Pre CSU
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum

35.05084746
1.972550339
34
42
15.15144665
229.5663355
0.556925883
0.420460073
62
10
72

Pscore Post CSU
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum

31.79661017
2.415464939
30
24
18.55353825
344.2337814
0.536846207
0.324959692
76
0
76
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Sum
Count
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2068 Sum
59 Count

1876
59

A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 below).
Figure 4.7. CSU PScore Pretest
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Figure 4.8 CSU PScore Posttest
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The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.73. A twotailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.00 and an observed t Stat of 1.95 suggesting
the 3.25-point decrease in the mean values is not statistically significant and supports a
failure to reject the null hypothesis for the CSU Postconventional Schema Score.
However, two-tailed p-value of 0.06 indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis for α =
.10. Consistent with Cohen’s (1992) use of Pearson’s Correlation as a test of effect size,
these results indicate a large effect size.
N2 Index score. Descriptive data for CSU is listed on the following page.
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Table 4.7
CSU N2 Index Score Descriptive Statistics
N2 Score Pre CSU
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

N2 Score Post CSU

32.99772139
1.881112029
33.72876867
#N/A
14.44909566
208.7763654
-0.461154555
0.220634071
61.14372514
5.300049497
66.44377464
1946.865562
59

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

31.47021292
2.263203332
33.5596598
#N/A
17.38399465
302.20327
-0.570050312
0.367551738
71.79608888
1.186909712
72.98299859
1856.742562
59

A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 below).
Figure 4.9. CSU N2Score Pretest
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Figure 4.10. CSU N2Score Posttest
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The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.75. A twotailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.00 and an observed t Stat of 1.02 suggesting
the 1.53-point increase in the mean values is not statistically significant. A two-tailed pvalue of 0.31 supports a failure to reject the null hypothesis for the CSU New Index
Score.

VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING

85

Utilizer score. For the utilizer score n was reduced from 59 to 56. This is
because the data used to calculate the score is different from the other scores, and 3
participants had incomplete data needed to calculate the score in this category.
Descriptive data for CSU is listed below.
Table 4.8
CSU Utilizer Score Descriptive Statistics
Utilizer Pre CSU
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.126362085
0.018289875
0.095107623
0
0.136868892
0.018733094
0.276525868
0.770059003
0.636753612
-0.11341853
0.523335081
7.076276769
56

Utilizer Post
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.094170655
0.017765001
0.089472952
0
0.132941094
0.017673335
2.138069176
0.565884025
0.783210405
0.382275826
0.400934579
5.273556698
56

A test for skewness indicates the data is moderately skewed (see Figures 4.11 and
4.12 on the next page).
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Figure 4.11. CSU Utilizer Pretest
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Figure 4.12. CSU Utilizer Posttest
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The data has low to moderate positive correlation with a Pearson Correlation of
0.33. A two-tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 2.00 and an observed t Stat of 1.54
suggesting the 0.03-point decrease in the mean values is not statistically significant. A
two-tailed p-value of 0.13 supports a failure to reject the null hypothesis for the CSU
Utilizer Score.

All Data Scores
All scores were analyzed at the “all data” level for all groups and all schools. In
the areas were there were not inconsistencies across schools (Personal Interest and
Maintaining Norms Scores), none were found at the all data level. As some of the school
level statistics for the Postconventional Schema, New Index, and Utilizer Scores suggests
a rejection of the null hypothesis, the results at the all data level for those scores are
presented here for comparison.
Postconventional schema score. Descriptive data for all data (n=107) is listed
on the following page.
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Table 4.9
All Data Postconventional Schema Score Descriptive Statistics
Pscore Pre All Data
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

Pscore Post

32.89719626
1.382622239
30
42
14.30195565
204.5459355
0.195573274
0.464953808
68
4
72
3520
107

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

32.03738318
1.545405488
32
36
15.98579867
255.5457591
0.164725703
0.29031359
76
0
76
3428
107

A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 below).
Figure 4.13. All Data PScore Pretest
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Figure 4.14. All Data PScore Posttest
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The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.72. A twotailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 1.98 and an observed t Stat of 0.78 suggesting
the 0.87-point increase in the mean values is not statistically significant. A two-tailed pvalue of 0.44 supports a failure to reject the null hypothesis for all data in the
Maintaining Norms Schema Score
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N2 Index score. Descriptive data for CSU is listed below.
Table 4.10
All Data N2 Index Score Descriptive Statistics
N2 Score Pre All Data
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

N2 Score Post All Data

30.7304535
1.336513636
31.29248276
#N/A

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode

31.82605466
1.551700796
34.19921192
#N/A

13.82500455
191.1307508
0.424322622
0.144334339
64.78096141
1.662813234
66.44377464
3288.158524
107

Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

16.05091784
257.6319636
0.621739994
0.275747926
71.79608888
1.186909712
72.98299859
3405.387849
107

A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 below).
Figure 4.15. All Data N2Score Pretest
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Figure 4.16. All Data N2Score Posttest
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The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.74. A twotailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 1.98 and an observed t Stat of -1.03 suggesting
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the 1.10-point increase in the mean values is not statistically significant. A two-tailed pvalue of 0.30 supports a failure to reject the null hypothesis for all data in the New Index
Score.
Utilizer score. Descriptive data for all data (n = 103) is listed below.
Table 4.11
All Data Utilizer Score Descriptive Statistics
Utilizer Pre All Data
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.162125165
0.013885951
0.134242265
0
0.140927008
0.019860421
0.649444608
0.309941174
0.636753612
-0.11341853
0.523335081
16.69889195
103

Utilizer Post
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.123949348
0.014077159
0.114840063
0
0.142867561
0.02041114
1.132244456
0.111179382
0.896171998
0.382275826
0.513896172
12.76678285
103

A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see Figures
4.17 and 4.18 on the next page).
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Figure 4.17. All Data Utilizer Pretest
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Figure 4.18. All Data Utilizer Posttest
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The data is moderately positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.55. A
two-tailed correlated t-test found a critical t of 1.98 and an observed t Stat of 2.89
suggesting the 0.04-point decrease in the mean values is statistically significant. A twotailed p-value of 0.005 supports a rejection of the null hypothesis for all data in the
Utilizer Score. Consistent with Cohen’s (1992) use of Pearson’s Correlation as a test of
effect size, these results indicate a large effect size.

Number of Values Shared Scores
As discussed previously, time limitations did not allow as many values to be
shared in Groups 4 & 5 (CSU). To have a MSC equivalent, Group 3 also shared 5 value
sets, although time was not an issue with this group. The following tests for differences in
results based on sharing 10 or more and only 5 of the student responses to the values
expressed exercise for the Postconventional Schema, New Index, and Utilizer Scores.
Postconventional schema score. Descriptive data for 10+ (n = 31) and 5 (n = 76)
responses shared are listed on the following page.
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Table 4.12
Shared 10+ Postconventional Schema Score Descriptive Statistics
Pscore Pre Shared 10+
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

31.29032258
2.120150912
32
32
11.80450069
139.3462366
0.061780038
0.135360544
54
4
58
970
31

Pscore Post Shared 10+
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

32.70967742
2.146361537
32
36
11.95043527
142.8129032
0.083121238
0.407443112
54
10
64
1014
31

Table 4.13
Shared 5 Postconventional Schema Score Descriptive Statistics
Pscore Pre Shared 5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

33.55263158
1.746615247
30
42
15.22663871
231.8505263
0.436529452
0.518998211
64
8
72
2550
76

Pscore Post Shared 5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

31.76315789
1.999286576
32
34
17.42937629
303.7831579
-0.39143388
0.294684185
76
0
76
2414
76
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A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see
Figures 4.19 through 4.22 below).
Figure 4.19. 10+ PScore Pretest
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Figure 4.21. 5 PScore Pretest
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Figure 4.20. 10+ PScore Posttest
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Figure 4.22. 5 PScore Posttest
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The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.84 for the
10+ group and 0.70 for the 5 group. A two-tailed correlated t-Test found a critical t of
2.04 for the 10+ group and an observed t Stat of -1.17 suggesting the 1.42-point increase
in the mean values is not statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.25 supports a
failure to reject the null hypothesis for the 10+ Maintaining Norms Schema Score.
A two-tailed correlated t-Test found a critical t of 1.99 for the 5 group and an
observed t Stat of 1.22 suggesting the 1.79-point decrease in the mean values is not
statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.23 supports a failure to reject the null
hypothesis for the 5 Maintaining Norms Schema Score.
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N2 Index score. Descriptive data for 10+ (n = 31) and 5 (n = 76) responses
shared are listed below.
Table 4.14
Shared 10+ N2 Index Score Descriptive Statistics
N2Score Pre Shared 10+
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

28.38912904
2.390570583
29.91984919
#N/A
13.3101337
177.1596591
0.840937711
0.339877518
50.39917637
1.662813234
52.06198961
880.0630002
31

N2Score Post Shared 10+
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

31.72975939
2.761188988
35.73612658
#N/A
15.37364965
236.3491035
-1.33088735
0.017614304
51.9509142
6.446759816
58.39767402
983.6225411
31

Table 4.15
Shared 5 N2 Index Score Descriptive Statistics
N2Score Pre Shared 5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum

31.68546742
1.606227905
31.40542903
#N/A
14.00277024
196.0775744
-0.44118115
0.287741742
61.14372514
5.300049497
66.44377464

N2Score Post Shared 5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum

31.86533299
1.883357879
33.62197303
#N/A
16.41873334
269.5748044
0.414103569
0.371488948
71.79608888
1.186909712
72.98299859
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2408.095524 Sum
76 Count

2421.765308
76

A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see
Figures 4.23 through 4.26 below).
Figure 4.23. 10+ NScore Pretest
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Figure 4.25. 5 NScore Pretest
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Figure 4.24. 10+ NScore Posttest
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Figure 4.26. 5 NScore Posttest
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The data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.88 for the
10+ group and 0.70 for the 5 group. A two-tailed correlated t-Test found a critical t of
2.04 for the 10+ group and an observed t Stat of -2.58 suggesting the 3.34-point increase
in the mean values is statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.02 supports a
rejection of the null hypothesis for the 10+ N2 Index Score. Consistent with Cohen’s
(1992) use of Pearson’s Correlation as a test of effect size, these results indicate a large
effect size.
A two-tailed correlated t-Test found a critical t of 1.99 for the 5 group and an
observed t Stat of -0.13 suggesting the 0.18-point increase in the mean values is not
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statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.90 supports a failure to reject the null
hypothesis for the 5 N2 Index Score.
Utilizer score. Descriptive data for 10+ (n = 30) and 5 (n = 76) responses shared
are listed on the following page.
Table 4.16
Shared 10+ Utilizer Score Descriptive Statistics
Utilizer Pre Shared 10+
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.221827634
0.022022013
0.221399887
#N/A
0.120619535
0.014549072
0.776757779
0.157485846
0.450668549
0.011838006
0.462506555
6.654829024
30

Utilizer Post Shared 10+
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.172362043
0.02351598
0.163756566
0
0.128802326
0.016590039
0.809677578
-0.27983185
0.595552223
0.174471993
0.421080231
5.170861277
30

Table 4.17
Shared 10+ Utilizer Score Descriptive Statistics
Utilizer Pre Shared 5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis

0.137589903
0.016626458
0.106492478
0

Utilizer Post Shared 5

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
0.142056517 Deviation
0.020180054 Sample Variance
0.397561041 Kurtosis

0.10405372
0.016902529
0.100943891
0
0.144415269
0.02085577
1.554738183
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Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.524816754
0.636753612
-0.11341853
0.523335081
10.04406293
73
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Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.003220993
0.896171998
0.382275826
0.513896172
7.595921572
73

A test for skewness indicates the data is approximately normally distributed (see
Figures 4.27 through 4.30 below).
Figure 4.27. 10+ Utilizer Pretest
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Figure 4.28. 10+ Utilizer Posttest
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Figure 4.29. 5 Utilizer Pretest
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Figure 4.30. 5 Utilizer Posttest
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The 10+ data is highly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation of 0.67,
but the 5 group is only moderately correlated at 0.48. A two-tailed correlated t-Test found
a critical t of 2.05 for the 10+ group and an observed t Stat of 2.70 suggesting the 0.05point decrease in the mean values is statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.01
supports a rejection of the null hypothesis for the 10+ Utilizer Score.
A two-tailed correlated t-Test found a critical t of 1.99 for the 5 group and an observed t
Stat of 1.96 suggesting the 0.04-point decrease in the mean values is just barely not
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statistically significant. A two-tailed p-value of 0.05 supports a rejection of the null
hypothesis for the 5 N2 Index Score.
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Results Summary
The chart below is a summary by data level and index of the results described in this chapter. The summary includes
the recommendation to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis.
Table 4.18
Results Summary
Data Level
MSC

CSU

All Data

10+
Shared

5 Shared

Index
Postconventional
N2
Utilizer
Postconventional
N2
Utilizer
Postconventional
N2
Utilizer

Pearson
Correlation
0.75
0.77
0.74
0.73
0.75
0.33
0.72
0.74
0.55

Critical
t
2.01
2.01
2.01
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.98
1.98
1.98

Observed t
-1.64
-3.22
3.05
1.95
1.02
1.54
0.78
-1.03
2.89

p-value
0.110
0.002
0.004
0.060
0.310
0.130
0.440
0.300
0.005

Reject the Null
Hypothesis?
Fail to reject
Yes
Yes
Yes at 90% C.L.
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Yes

Effect
Size
N/A
Large
Large
Large
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Large

Postconventional
N2
Utilizer
Postconventional
N2
Utilizer

0.84
0.88
0.67
0.70
0.70
0.48

2.04
2.04
2.05
1.99
1.99
1.99

-1.17
-2.58
2.70
1.22
-0.13
1.96

0.250
0.020
0.010
0.230
0.900
0.050

Fail to reject
Yes
Yes
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Yes

N/A
Large
Large
N/A
N/A
Large
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Chapter 5
Discussion

According to Rest et al. (2000), over 25 years of data—with approximately 13,
386 responses with 10, 870 included in the analysis—have found test-retest results
without interventions to be unchanged for all groups. Researchers have also found that
DIT scores “show significant gains due to moral educational programs of more than 3
weeks” and during the college years in liberal arts programs (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).
This study is unique in that the intervention is very short, does not attempt to “teach”
participants about values or ethical decision-making, and is largely personal in its impact
as there is no discussion, only sharing. This supports the exploratory nature of the
research. The intervention does reframe decision-making in value terms and brings the
assignment of values to decision considerations to the conscious level for individuals and
the group. Yet this minor intervention did cause some statistically significant changes in
scores.

Postconventional and N2 Scores
When the results are analyzed for all participants together, there is little change in
the Postconventional and N2 Scores, however there are some interesting and significant
results when we look at the schools individually. MSC students improved their N2 Scores
by a statistically significant 4.32 points. This indicates they shifted their use of lower
stage items to Postconventional items and became better ethical decision-makers. They
also increased their Postconventional scores by 2.08 points. Tests for statistical
significance were not quite enough to support statistical significance at a 90% confidence

VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING

100

level (p-value 0.11) for the Postconventional scores, but it does contribute to the upward
trend of MSC scores reflected in the N2 score.
CSU students, by contrast, saw a decrease of 3.25 points in their Postconventional
scores indicating the amount of their decision-making in Stages 5 and 6 may have
decreased as these results are only statistically significant at a 90% confidence level. The
student’s N2 scores decreased by 1.53 points, which was not a statistically significant
change. At a 95% confidence level the results indicate that the CSU groups scores were
relatively unchanged.

Norm Comparisons Postconventional and N2 Scores
Assuming the CSU scores were unchanged or only had a very small change, what
might have contributed to no change or a small change in ethical decision-making at CSU
while there were significant improvements at MSC? The DIT norms suggest several
factors that correlate with scores that might give us some clues.
Cognitive development. DIT scores are often positively correlated with cognitive
development including IQ, general intelligence, achievement, and GPA. While GPA data
on all participants was not available, we can make some inferences about the cognitive
development of our groups. CSU is a selective school and according to the Colorado
State University Profile (2013), students admitted to the university are in the 74th
percentile of their graduating class, have an average high school GPA of 3.59, an ACT
composite score of 24.7, and/or a SAT combined score of 1142. MSC is an open
enrollment school and does not have any gates for class rank, high school GPA, or ACT
or SAT scores. We can infer from their open enrollment status that MSC will have a
much broader range of student ability than CSU. MSC students are required to take a

VALUES IN MICROECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING

101

math and English placement test and with only 75% of students entering the school with
college level math and/or reading skills, we can also assume the level of cognitive
development of MSC students entering the school is lower than CSU.
Because of this difference, norms indicate that CSU students would have higher
scores on the DIT than MSC students. On the pretest, this was true with a CSU
Postconventional score of 35.05 compared to MSC’s at 30.25 and N2 Scores of 33.00
(CSU) and 27.94 (MSC). However, cognitive development fails to explain the posttest
results as MSC’s posttest scores for both the Postconventional and N2 Scores were above
CSU’s and overall closer in value with CSU than the pretest scores were.
Education. A second factor that is often correlated with DIT scores is level of
education. Related to college students the norms indicate junior and senior level students
will outperform freshman and sophomore level students. Again, this factor fails to
explain the posttest scores as the CSU students were juniors and seniors in upper division
classes and should have outperformed the MSC students who were largely freshman and
sophomores in lower division classes.
Gender. Gender is another factor that often predicts performance on
Postconventional scores. Norms indicate female participants generally score higher than
males. In this study 67% of MSC participants were female and 58% at CSU. Based on
these ratios we might expect the MSC group to consistently outscore the CSU group, but
that was not the case. However, the N2 Score results for MSC may have been impacted
by the high percentage of women in the group. When looked at alone, female participants
increased their mean score by a statistically significant 5.18 points (t-critical 2.04,
observed t -3.26, p-value .003) compared to the male participants who increased their
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score by a statistically insignificant 2.61 points. Similar gender differences were not
observed at CSU.
It is possible that traditionally higher scores by women could indicate more
sensitivity to values and ethics in decision-making then men and/or that women are more
likely to adjust individual decision-making in a group when values are shared. Several
studies support the possibility of either of these factors influencing ethics scores. A study
on business students by Stedham et al. (2007) found that women have a stronger “intent”
to behave in an ethical manner so by reframing the decision-making process in values
terms, the study may have engaged the ethical decision-making perspective to a higher
degree for women than it did for the male participants as females appear to be more
sensitive to subtle ethical context than males are. Studies have also indicated that women
“focus their [ethical] analysis on personal, relationship-oriented aspects of an action”
(Stedham et al., 2007, p. 171) and are less likely to prefer competitive success and more
likely to promote harmonious work relationships and engage in social learning (Ameen,
Guffey, & McMillan, 1996). While men are more likely to focus on clear-cut objective
criteria in ethical decision-making, women are more likely to consider ‘relative’
considerations (Stedham et al., 2007). Female students are also more likely to engage in
impression management than males so by reframing decision-making in a values/ethics
framework, female students may be more likely to answer in a way that will give the
impression of being ethical (Becker & Ulstad, 2007). The fact that there were not similar
results for N2 or P Scores at CSU might indicate that gender was one, but not the only
factor that caused women at MSC to improve their scores more dramatically than men.

Non-Normed Factors for Postconventional and N2 Scores
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Reviewing the norms associated with the DIT-2 did not sufficiently explain our
results. As this research is utilizing an intervention that appears to be significantly
different than the pre- and posttest experiments in the past, it is possible that the norms do
not apply as strongly to this research. The following are some other factors to consider
that might help explain the results.
Group cognitive “sameness” and number of values shared. One issue that
needs to be considered is to what degree the participants in the groups were similar
before the experiment and how that may have impacted results. As discussed in the
“Cognitive Development” section, there are reasons to believe the individual’s in the
CSU group were more alike than the individual’s in the MSC group. The CSU students
all went through a competitive admission process that was looking for similar
characteristics, intellectual capacity, etc. The MSC students were part of an open
enrollment campus and provide a much more diverse, although more geographically
isolated group.
As we assume decision-making is a cognitive process, it is possible that the
cognitive “sameness” of the individuals in the CSU classes impacted their ability to be
influenced by the sharing of values, because there values were less diverse to begin with
as they shared a similar cognitive decision-making process. To test for “sameness” I
looked at the three groups that only shared 5 sets of values and compared the average
number of distinct values shared per decision consideration. The groups included both
CSU groups (Groups 4 & 5) and one MSC group (Group 3). I found that the MSC group
averaged 4.4 values per decision consideration and CSU Group 4 averaged 4.2 and Group
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5 averaged 3.5. This does provides some evidence that the CSU groups, especially Group
5 had more similar values systems prior to the experiment than MSC students did.
Another factor is that students in the CSU classes only shared 5 random sets of
values, whereas 2 of 3 MSC classes shared 13 and 10. When the data was analyzed using
the number of sets of values shared, the “10+” group (n = 31) had a statistically
significant increase in the N2 Score, whereas the “5” group (n = 76) had no significant
changes. This data supports a possibility that the number and diversity of the values
shared might also make a difference in future decision-making; however, additional
research needs to be done to verify these potential correlations.
Relationships. Another factor the results lead us to consider is the potential role
of relationships. Much of the literature reviewed on the values ether (Bell, 2011b),
behavioral economics/finance (Ariely, 2008; Sen 1977; 1994; Thaler 1988; Thaler &
Sunstein, 2009) value development (Schwartz, 1992; Kohlberg, 1973; Babeau, et al,
1999), social learning theory (Bandura, 1977), and sensemaking in organizations (Weick,
1995; Weick et al., 2005) suggest relationships have an impact on values in decisionmaking. It is possible to infer from the distinct differences in the groups that there may be
some different levels of relationships between the CSU and MSC students. According to
the Colorado State University Profile (2013), students at CSU come from every state in
the country with 80% being Colorado residents. The campus and community are large
both in geographic and population terms and students are primarily of traditional college
age (24 and under). By contrast, MSC students are primarily local with 96% of the
student population coming from Alaska and 44% graduating from high schools in one the
MSC local area communities. The campus and the student population are small as is the
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number of full-time faculty (29). Only 57% of MSC students are of traditional age and
43% are non-traditional (University of Alaska Planning and Institutional Research, 2011).
The differences between the two campuses make it likely that MSC students may
have stronger and longer relationships with each other and faculty and staff than CSU
students do. These relationships may extend beyond the campus and into the local
community. Many of the MSC students have known each other even before attending the
university and the small campus size allows them to get to know a greater percentage of
the other students, faculty and staff. Smaller class sizes also allow students to form
relationships and get to know the perspectives of other students through class discussions.
The size of the individual groups might also be a factor in this research as it relates to
relationship building. The MSC students are not only more likely to come from the same
small community, but are also generally older so they may have known each other for a
longer period of time. For students reporting their length of time with their cohort, the
majority of MSC students (78.7%) report being part of their cohort for 2 years or less,
whereas the majority of CSU students (63%) report a 3 or more year relationship with
their cohort. If relationships were a factor, it does not appear that the shorter length of
time in the MSC cohort impacted their relationships in a negative way indicating that
perhaps other factors strengthen relationships of university students.
The issue of relationships also ties back to the discussion of gender. As the
majority of participants at MSC were female—and were the group primarily responsible
for the N2 Score increase—we need to consider the combination of gender and
relationships as a possible explanation for the differences in scores between MSC and
CSU students. In a previous section I discussed how women might be more sensitive to
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values and ethics in decision-making and have stronger intent to behave ethically. They
are also more likely to analyze their decision-making relative to others, engage in social
learning, and be concerned with harmonious relationships. By reframing the discussion of
decision-making in a value context and by and reflecting on and sharing values, it is
possible that females in small groups within which they have strong relationships might
have been more likely to move toward more shared ethical decision-making than women
who are in groups that do not have strong relationships or are in some way moderated by
an equal male presence.

Utilizer Scores
Another data point that is significant to this study is the utilizer score (U Score).
The U Score measures the degree of match between the action participants said they
would take in each of the scenarios and the decision considerations they rated as most
important. The test assumes certain decision considerations, when important to the
decision-maker, will lead to a specific action. For every data level with the exception of
the CSU group alone, the U Scores dropped by a statistically significant amount posttest.
One possible reason for this decrease might be a limitation of the test itself. This
score is essentially designed to test the ability of participants to rationally analyze
available factors and match them to decision-making. The test assumes rationality and
access to all information, as the scope of available information is provided in the scenario
and given decision considerations. It does not assume that participants are brining other
factors—like values—to the decision-making process. Students taking a posttest after a
course in ethics might be likely to see an increase in the U Score because it is this rational
process of ethical decision-making that those courses attempt to teach. However, by
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reframing the decision-making process in a values perspective, the experiment may have
brought the value portion of the decision-making process to the forefront impacting the
rational decision-making process. Students may have selected answers and decision
considerations that were consistent with their values and these may have conflicted with
what is consistent with rational decision-making. While outside the scope of this paper,
qualitative analysis of the value sets and decision sets might provide some insights into
the level of “values fit” versus “rational fit” of the participant’s responses. It is also
important to note that the scores dropped the most for the “10+” shared value sets
indicating that perhaps the more values perspectives shared, the more prominent values
become as a decision consideration. This might also explain the lack of significant
change at CSU. Kahneman (2011) would refer to this as values “priming”. The more you
are primed to think of values the more you will use values factors rather than “rational”
factors in matching decisions to decision considerations.
It is also possible that by framing the decision-making process in value terms that
the opportunity set—the set of alternative actions an individual can take to solve a
problem—changed for the individuals. Sen (1994) believes that when the opportunity set
is influenced by ethics, social behavior, epistemology, or other non-rational choice
influences these factors narrow the opportunity set. He refers to this process as menu
dependency; meaning when non-rational factors are added to the decision the menu of
choices becomes smaller than the opportunity set. There may have been some decision
considerations that while they were consistent with the action the individual believed he
or she would take, may not have been consistent with their values. Or, they may have
selected an action based on their values that was inconsistent with the rational decision-
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making process they went through when selecting important decision considerations. It is
also important to note, that while their decision-making process became more quasirational, no group made decisions that were significantly less ethical than they did when
they were using a more rational process. The MSC group actually significantly improved
their scores bringing them up to approximately the same level at CSU students.

Research Conclusions
Asking participants to reflect on and share the values they associate with decision
considerations produced some significant results. MSC students demonstrated a
statistically significant increase in their ethical decision-making ability, while all groups
changed the way they used information to make ethical decisions.
Much of the literature reviewed suggests that relationships are an important factor
when values are formed and utilized in decision-making. This research provides some
support for that assertion at least within the context of women within small groups with
relatively strong relationships in a community. Sharing a greater portion of the groups
values might also impact improved ethical decision-making, however, more research is
needed to determine if this factor also relates to gender, group size, and relationships.
Group “sameness” may be a factor in maintaining a similar level of ethical
decision-making even after a values context is introduced. This is because groups that are
already very much the same, at least in terms of cognitive development and deciding to
attend the same school, may already have similar values structures that will reinforce one
another rather than challenge values. More cognitive and value diversity might cause
others to be influenced by shared values in a group as demonstrated by the significant
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improvements in ethical decision-making at MSC. This is important, because the MSC
group may be more closely representative of the general population than the CSU group.
The increase in ethical decision-making by the MSC group suggests some
interesting correlations between group size, group diversity, gender, and relationships in
decision-making. However, the most significant result of this research is the Utilizer
Score results. One goal of this research was to determine what the role of values is in
decision-making. The models of economic decision-making assume a dichotomy between
facts and values in decision-making with individuals always making decisions using
rational factors. The Utilizer Score results indicate that values do play a role in how we
make decisions. By framing decision-making in a values context and priming for values,
values considerations were brought to the forefront and the decision-makers became
more quasi-rational in their approach. Yet, in no way did it make participants worse
decision-makers—at least in the ethical context measured here. In fact, some individuals
and groups became significantly better ethical decision-makers even using an instrument
that relies on rational decision-making as the assumption. The utilization of values in
decision-making might make us more quasi-rational in our approach, but does not
necessarily make us worse decision-makers. In other words, a quasi-rational approach to
the decision-making process does not lead us to make less rational decisions. In this case,
values changed what individuals believed were important issues to consider in the
decision-making process, but did not lead them to less ethical decisions. Introducing
conscious values to the process can interrupt unconscious values schemas. As this
research is exploratory in nature, additional research will need to be done to further
isolate all the potential factors discussed here to determine their impact on economic
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decision-making. The purpose of this research is to provide potential signals of direction
and hypotheses for future research.
It should be noted that values were not utilized alone, but along with the facts
given in the scenario. These results do not tell us what would happen if we asked
participants to use values alone in their decision-making. However, the combined use of
facts and values in decision-making is consistent with and supports the values inclusive
models of decision-making discussed in the literature (Bell, 2011b; Etzioni, 1988; HueiChun, 2010; Subramaniam, 1963; Sen, 1994; 2004).

Limitations
One of the greatest threats to multiple group tests is the selection threat or
selection bias as this was a convenience sample, specifically the primary internal validity
issue, which is the degree to which the groups are comparable before the study. This
issue has been addressed in the results section and having groups from one university that
may have been more comparable before the study than the groups at the second
university proved to be an asset to the study. The short duration of the experiment did
minimize history, maturation, and mortality threats.
Using validated and identical instruments administered by the same researcher
across groups minimized one instrumentation threat. However, the instrument itself was
both a limitation and an asset, as it was not designed for the type of intervention utilized
here.
As with any research, Type I (false positive) and Type II (false negative) errors
were a threat. The researched attempted to minimize these threats by repeating the
experiment 5 times. As this research is exploratory, repeating the experiment in the future
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to gather additional data would help further minimize these threats and provide validity
for the results discussed here.
One potential limitation to any study is that it may not be representative of the
general population. Using business students that are too similar might lead to concerns
about generalizability; however, there were a diverse group of majors in the classes. In
addition to business administration majors including human resources, entrepreneurship,
finance, economics, hospitality management, accounting, and marketing majors there
were computer science, mechanical engineering, nursing, logistics and supply chain
management, human services, music, dental hygiene, computer networking technology,
interior design and equine science majors represented in the classes. By including an
“open enrollment” campus in the experiments this does help with generalizability, as
these students are quite diverse. As a result, these findings should be generalizable to a
broader population. This study was done in classrooms on university campuses, which
leaves the potential for noise and other distractions that could impact participants.
Another limitation is that the study asked participants to describe a single value
that represented the personal values of a decision-maker who believed a particular
decision consideration was important. It does not include multiple values that might be
the optimal description. The study is also limited to the role of values in ethical decisionmaking, whereas values may have a role in other aspects of decision-making.
The time required to complete the experiment also proved to be a limitation.
While I had several campuses willing to participate, individual professors and department
heads were often unwilling to give up an entire class for the experiment. This
significantly reduced my participant options. While this was a convenience sample, it
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might have been preferable to have larger class sizes to more accurately analyze data for
statistical significance at the group level. However, the variety of class sizes did add
diversity and the ability to consider whether the size of the group might have impacted
group or school results.
Subject confidentiality is a potential ethical issue that was addressed by assigning
anonymous participant numbers to each participant. All results were stored in a secured
file cabinet and computer to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the data. In addition,
the study and use of student participants was reviewed and approved by the George Fox
University Human Subjects Committee. A copy of the approval is available in Appendix
H.

Implications for Organizations and Leaders
The literature reviewed for this study suggests, and nearly all the participants in
these experiments have stated, that they consider their personal values when making
work decisions (Brown & Trevino, 2006; Finegan, 2000; Gamble & Gibson, 1999; Jiang,
Lin, & Lin, 2010; Keltner, Langner, & Allison, 2006; Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989;
Palmer, 2000; ; Suar & Khuntia, 2010; ). Bringing values to the conscious level can
interrupt unconscious values schemas providing support for the influence of group,
societal, environmental, and organizational values in microeconomic decision-making
creating implications for organizations and leaders. There is also evidence to suggest that
by adding a values framework to decision-making, employees may make better decisions
or, if they already share similar values, they will maintain their current level of decisionmaking at least from an ethical perspective.
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As this experiment was limited to ethical decision-making and values, what can
organizations and leaders learn from this research? As individual’s report bringing their
personal values to work, how can leaders in organizations encourage ethical decisionmaking in groups?
One important application for leaders to learn from this research is that hiring
cognitively diverse employees can help eliminate “groupthink” by challenging the ideas
and perceptions of others from a values context. Often pre-employment tests are designed
to measure the rational or “process” thinking of individuals with hiring preferences being
given to those individuals who perform highly on these tests. In our research groups, SAT
scores were a major factor in creating the CSU group indicating relative cognitive
sameness, but also indications of groupthink as adding a values framework did not
challenge their decision-making because their decision-making processes may have
already been similar. This study indicates diverse, even quasi-rational approaches to
decision-making can result in more rational and ethical decision-making. Leaders should
look for individuals with diverse values, perceptions, and decision-making processes in
order to improve organizational decision-making and minimize groupthink.
The results of this research are consistent with sensemaking literature that
suggests placing stimuli into some kind of framework allows employees to better
comprehend problems and solutions so they may take appropriate actions. In this case we
framed and “primed” the stimuli within a values framework that helped some groups
improve their ethical decision-making. Organizations can do the same by developing
values statements and then challenging employees to consider company and personal
values in their decision-making. Ancona (2012) states that sensemaking “involves
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coming up with plausible understandings and meanings; testing them with others and via,
action; and then refining our understandings or abandoning them in favor of new ones
that better explain a shifting reality” (p. 5). Organizational leaders might encourage
employees to consider and share values associated with decisions to help them either
make better ethical decisions or gain a greater level of commitment to ethical decisions
when they are made. This form of “sensegiving” that focuses on finding opportunities to
describe ethical decision-making in a way that appeals to the values of employees, can
help organizations reach strategic ethics goals (Bartunek, Krim, Necochea, &
Humphries,1999). When personal values and organizational values are brought closer
together there is greater organizational commitment that leads to less absenteeism and
turnover and improved job satisfaction, organizational citizenship, and job performance
(Finegan, 2000).
By framing decision-making in a values context, leaders in organizations may
also be able to promote congruency with the values of the organization helping front-line
employees understand how their personal values and actions can support the mission of
the organization. Sensemaking theory supports this strategy as interacting with others in a
values framework allows mental models to be tested and modified (Ancona, 2012) as we
saw in the experiment’s ability to interrupt both unconscious values schemas and
decision-making processes.
As discussed in the literature review, leaders who articulate their values and
model ethical behavior can reduce unethical behavior and interpersonal conflicts (Mayer
et al., 2012), make ethical behaviors by subordinates a habit (Almeida, 2011), and
positively impact the personal values of employees (Weiss, 1978). Having employees
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working from a common “map”—in this case using values as a guide—it is easier to
coordinate consistent ethical actions across departments (Ancona, 2012).

Implications for Academicians
The study of economic decision-making has focused on removing value
judgments from the discussion of economic decision-making in favor of the rational
choice tautology. The emphasis on rational, mechanical-mathematical models was
designed to remove the “softer” social science aspects of economic thought in order to
bring the discipline closer to the hard sciences (Binmore, 2007; Nelson, 2003; Punam,
2002). Yet economic decision-making is much more complex and, as this research has
demonstrated, may be influenced by both internal and external “non-rational” factors that
disrupt the assumption of the rational actor at least in the decision-making process. If
values are included in economic decision-making, academicians will need to find ways to
build layers on top of rational mechanical-mathematical models to capture these
influences. By attempting to remove values from the decision-making process we are
essentially disconnecting individuals from their decisions, yet individual actors can
influence those around them.
The most significant implication for academicians is the need to differentiate
between the rationality of the decision-making process and rational decisions. The study
indicates the decision-making process can be less rational than traditional economic
models require, yet lead to equally or better rational decisions. Traditional rational
models require consideration of marginal cost/marginal benefit “facts” exclusively,
however, assigning personal values to the decision considerations in this study caused the
decision-making process to appear less rational, but often improved the rationality of
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decisions. This appears to be especially true when a cognitively diverse group exists, as
we would expect in the general population. In diverse populations consciously adding
and recognizing values considerations in the economic decision-making process may lead
to better consensus as this research found reflecting on and sharing values moved the
groups toward more equally rational decisions in the ethical context tested here. The
literature reviewed here suggests this value inclusive process may be more consistent
with how most individuals actually make decisions in groups.

Recommendations for Future Research
This exploratory research provides evidence that gender, group size, and
relationships may impact how individuals use values in their decision-making in groups
when those values are shared. There is also evidence to support that even if the decisionmaking process becomes more quasi-rational as a result of adding values to decision
considerations, this process still results in the same or better decisions. This study was
limited to an instrument that tests values schemas in ethical decision-making. Additional
research could be done using other instruments to determine if the same factors impact
other decisions. Experiments using the DIT2 that look specifically at group diversity,
gender, group size, and relationships would also be useful in validating the results of this
study as well as how the factors interact. For example, the research suggests females in
small groups with close relationships might be influenced by the values of a group more
so than when only one of the factors exists. The next step is to measure the interactions of
these factors to determine their weights and influence. Also, while the study indicates an
ability to disrupt values schemas in the very short-run, additional research needs to be
done to determine whether there is a longer-term impact to the values schema disruption.
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A qualitative approach that looks for changes in decision sets based on the values
of individuals and the values set shared with the group would also provide additional
insights into how shared values impact future decisions. Do participants move toward
decision considerations that others assigned positive values to? Were they likely to give
less weight to a decision consideration that most felt demonstrated the lack of a positive
value?
As this was a quasi-experimental laboratory design, additional field studies using
a Natualistic Decision Making model (Lipshitz et al., 2001) to determine how individuals
respond to reframing decision-making in a values framework in organizational settings as
there is a risk that recognition priming could have led participants to match decision
considerations with values, but not the action participants would actually take.

Conclusion
The broad purpose of this research was to explore the role of values in economic
decision-making as presented by Bell’s (2011b) model of values inclusive economic
decision-making. To accomplish this a more narrow purpose was established to explore
the role reflecting on and sharing values plays in our individual decision-making schemas
in groups. Specifically to answer the question: Can introducing values consciously into
decision considerations disrupt existing unconscious values schemas?
To accomplish this goal a quasi-experimental pretest/posttest design was
developed using the Defining Issues 2 Test (DIT2). The DIT2 measures the unconscious
values schemas individuals use in their decision-making that determine their level of
ethical decision-making. Participants were not told the instrument measured ethical
decision-making, only that it was designed to measure how they make decisions.
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Participants were given the DIT2 as a pretest and then asked to assign the values
they associated with each of the decision considerations in the first scenario. Depending
on the group, either all or random samples of 5 or 10 of the values assigned were
anonymously shared with the group. It is important to note that they were not discussed,
only shared and that this brief activity was the first time a values frame was introduced to
the decision-making process. Participants were then given the DIT2 as a posttest. The
entire process took between 1 ¼ and 1 ½ hours. Prior to running the experiments, the
instrument and process were piloted with a class at MSC.
The study found several significant results. First, reframing decision-making in a
values context made the decision process more quasi-rational for participants as a whole,
yet led to consistent or improved decisions in the ethical context tested here. Decisions
remained consistent in the CSU group where the group may have had more “sameness”
going into the experiment. This suggests that sharing values reinforced, rather than
challenged existing values schemas.
The MSC group both significantly improved Postconventional ethical decisionmaking and moved away from lower level (personal interest) decision considerations.
This is significant because rational, mechanical-mathematical economic models are based
on an assumption of “self-interest”, while the study demonstrated the consideration of
values in addition to facts moved individual and group decision-making farther away
from pure self-interest in this instance This is consistent with both Bell’s (2011) and
Sen’s (1994; 2004) ideas of more holistic factors beyond self-interest in economic
decision considerations. There is evidence to suggest group diversity, gender, group size,
and relationships may have impacted the use of values and were factors in the
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improvements at MSC as well, but additional research is need to add validity to these
results. The results also reflect a short-term interruption of values schemas and additional
research is needed to determine any long-term impacts. However, Bell’s model suggests
schemas are constantly changing so any measure at a point in time may yield different
results based on the influences at the time.
These results have implications for academicians. It suggests a need to add layers
on top of rational, mechanical-mathematical models to include values in descriptive and
predictive economic models. For Bell’s (2011b) theory of value-inclusive economic
decision-making it has meant adding additional factors including the external
environment, values schemas, and social learning to provide a more complete picture of
how values are developed, utilized in decision-making, and influenced/modified. It also
means distinguishing between the rationality of the decision-making process and rational
decisions as the results indicate a more quasi-rational process can still lead to more
rational decisions.
For businesses and managers, the study provides insight into how employees
might use personal values to make sense of information and situations and make
decisions at work. Bringing values to the conscious level can interrupt unconscious
values schemas providing support for the influence of group, societal, environmental, and
organizational values in microeconomic decision-making creating implications for
organizations and leaders. By framing decision-making in a values context, leaders in
organizations may also be able to promote congruency with the values of the organization
helping front-line employees understand how their personal values and actions can
support the mission of the organization. Sensemaking theory supports this strategy as
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interacting with others in a values framework allows mental models to be tested and
modified (Ancona, 2012) as we saw in the experiment’s ability to interrupt both
unconscious values schemas and decision-making processes.
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Appendix A
Defining Issues Test-2 and Demographic Questions
Pre-Test
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Appendix B
Defining Issues Test-2
Post-Test
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Appendix C
Values/Anti-Values Prompts

Freedom/Servitude
Creativity/Uncreative
Independent/Dependent
Choosing own goals/Not choosing own
goals
Curious/Disinterested
Self-respect/Shame
An exciting life/An unexciting life
A varied life/An homogeneous life
Daring/Unadventurous
Pleasure/Dissatisfaction
Enjoying life/Disliking life
Ambitious/Unambitious
Influential/Insignificant
Capable/Unqualified
Successful/Unsuccessful
Intelligent/Unintelligent
Self-respect/Shame
Social power/Social Weakness
Wealth/Indebtedness
Authority/Powerlessness
Preserving my public image/Disregarding
my public image
Social recognition/Social disgrace
National security/National insecurity
Reciprocation of favors/Nonreciprocation of
favors
Family security/Family insecurity
Sense of belonging/sense of distance
Social order/Social disorder
Healthy/Unhealthy
Clean/Unclean

Obedient/Disobedient
Self-discipline/Unconstraint
Politeness/Rudeness
Honoring of parents and elders/Dishonoring
of parents and elders
Respect for tradition/Disrespect for tradition
Devout/Unfaithful
Accepting my portion in life/Not accepting
my portion in life
Humble/Arrogant
Moderate/Intemperate
A spiritual life/A nonspiritual life
Meaning of life/No meaning of life
Inner harmony/Inner conflict
Detachment/Bias
Helpful/Unhelpful
Responsible/Irresponsible
Forgiving/Not forgiving
Honest/Dishonest
Loyal/Disloyal
Mature love/Immature love
True friendship/False friendship
Equality/Inequality
Unity with nature/Disunity with nature
Wisdom/Imprudence
A world of beauty/A world of ugliness
Social justice/Social injustice
Broad-minded/Narrow-minded
Protecting the environment/Harming the
environment
A world at peace/A world in disharmony
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Appendix D
Values Expressed

Participant number_________________

Example
Imagine you are about to vote for a candidate for the Presidency of
the United States. Before you vote, you are asked to rate the
importance of five issues you could consider in deciding who to vote for.
Decision Consideration

Value Expressed

Financially are you personally better off now than you
were four years ago?

_______________

Does one candidate have a superior moral character?

_______________

Which candidate stands the tallest?

_______________

Which candidate would make the best world leader?

_______________

Which candidate has the best ideas for our country’s internal
Problems, like crime and health care.

_______________
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Story 1-Famine
The small village in northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but this year’s
famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to feed themselves by making soup
from tree bark. Mustaq Singh’s family is near starvation. He has heard that a rich man in his
village has supplies of food stored away and is hording food while its price goes higher so that he
can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq is desperate and thinks about stealing some food
from the rich man’s warehouse. The small amout of food that he needs for his family probably
wouldn’t even be missed.
Decision Consideration

Value Expressed

Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught for
stealing?

_______________

Isn’t it only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family
that he would steal?

_______________

Shouldn’t the community’s laws be upheld?

_______________

Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from
tree bark?

_______________

Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other
people are starving?

_______________

Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for
his family?

_______________

What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation?

_______________

Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of
stealing?

_______________

Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy?

_______________

Isn’t private property an institution to enable the rich to exploit
the poor?

_______________

Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned
or wouldn’t it?

_______________

Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member
of society?

_______________
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Appendix E

Shared Values Set: Group 1
Decision Consideration
Is Mustaq Singh courageous
enough to risk getting
caught for stealing?
Isn’t it only natural for a
loving father to care so
much for his family that he
would steal?
Shouldn’t the community’s
laws be upheld?
Does Mustaq Singh know a
good recipe for preparing
soup from tree bark?
Does the rich man have any
legal right to store food
when other people are
starving?
Is the motive of Mustaq
Singh to steal for himself or
to steal forhis family?
What values are going to be
the basis for social
cooperation?
Is the epitome of eating
reconcilable with the
culpability of stealing?
Does the rich man deserve
to be robbed for being so
greedy?
Isn’t private property an
institution to enable the rich
to exploitthe poor?
Would stealing bring about
more total good for
everybody concerned or
wouldn’t it?
Are laws getting in the way
of the most basic claim of
any memberof society?

Value Expressed
Responsible, daring, dishonest, capable, disobedient, daring,
disliking life, loyalty, disregarding public image, self-respect,
courage
Responsible, health, social disorder, family security, family
insecurity, family loyalty, devout

Unhealthy, authority, disobedience, protecting the environment,
social justice, social order, not accepting portion in life, servitude
Capable, helpful, creativity, unhealthy, world of ugliness, health,
insignificant, healthy
Inner conflict, equality, wealth, social injustice, detachment, disunity
with nature, social justice, bias

Family security, forgiving, shame, irresponsible, responsible,
reciprocation of favors, immature love, mature love, social justice
Forgiving, world at peace, self-respect, social justice, responsible,
authority, accepting my portion in life, wealth, social injustice
Self respect, shame, social justice, social order, health, pleasure,
arrogant, inner conflict, disloyal, dishonest, shame, narrow mind
Rudeness, social justice, social injustice, wealth, social order,
dishonesty, moderate, accepting portion in life, social power
Unhelpful, not accepting one’s portion in live, social order, shame,
wealth narrow minded, social justice, irresponsible, inequality,
social weakness, security, equality, social injustice
Responsible, social injustice, authority, a world in disharmony,
social weakness, independent, equality, unhelpful, sense of distance,
inequality, helpful, social order
Freedom, powerlessness, social power, social justice, social
injustice, unhelpful, meaning of life, broad minded, honest, social
disorder
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Shared Values Set: Group 2
Decision Consideration
Is Mustaq Singh courageous
enough to risk getting caught
for stealing?
Isn’t it only natural for a
loving father to care so
much for his family that he
would steal?
Shouldn’t the community’s
laws be upheld?
Does Mustaq Singh know a
good recipe for preparing
soup from
tree bark?
Does the rich man have any
legal right to store food
when other
people are starving?
Is the motive of Mustaq
Singh to steal for himself or
to steal for his family?
What values are going to be
the basis for social
cooperation?
Is the epitome of eating
reconcilable with the
culpability of stealing?
Does the rich man deserve to
be robbed for being so
greedy?
Isn’t private property an
institution to enable the rich
to exploit the poor?
Would stealing bring about
more total good for
everybody concerned
or wouldn’t it?
Are laws getting in the way
of the most basic claim of
any member of society?

Value Expressed
Ambitious, family security, powerlessness, social recognition,
daring, arrogant, excepting my portion in live, loyal
Family security, responsible, devout, healthy

Social justice, social order, obedient, social weakness, inequality
Not choosing own goals, creativity, excepting portion in life,
insignificant, helpful, capable

Helpful, authority, wealth, social power, unhelpful, social justice,
equality

Family security, meaning of life, self respect, responsible, inner
conflict, detachment
Social order, social justice, authority, wealth, a world at peace,
influential, social injustice, equality
Honest, wisdom, narrow minded, forgiving, unhealthy, reciprocation
of favors, not accepting portion in life, social justice, a world of
ugliness, responsible
Arrogance, social justice, politeness, dishonest, social injustice,
social power, a world of ugliness, inequality
Social injustice, wealth, bias, humble, equality, inequality, freedom

Social order, a world at peace, inequality, respect for tradition, a
world in disharmony, unhelpful, helpful

Social justice, dissatisfaction, equality, family security, obedience,
social disorder, protect the environment, social order, choosing own
goals
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Shared Values Set: Group 3
Decision Consideration
Is Mustaq Singh
courageous enough to risk
getting caught for stealing?
Isn’t it only natural for a
loving father to care so
much for his family that he
would steal?
Shouldn’t the community’s
laws be upheld?
Does Mustaq Singh know a
good recipe for preparing
soup from
tree bark?
Does the rich man have any
legal right to store food
when other
people are starving?
Is the motive of Mustaq
Singh to steal for himself or
to steal for his family?
What values are going to be
the basis for social
cooperation?
Is the epitome of eating
reconcilable with the
culpability of stealing?
Does the rich man deserve
to be robbed for being so
greedy?
Isn’t private property an
institution to enable the rich
to exploit the poor?
Would stealing bring about
more total good for
everybody concerned
or wouldn’t it?
Are laws getting in the way
of the most basic claim of
any member of society?

Value Expressed
Dishonesty, family security, unintelligent, social disorder, capable

Powerlessness, shame, family security, choosing own goals, selfrespect

Social justice, shame, servitude, social order, quality
Unhelpful, insignificant, arrogant, unintelligent

Disloyal, wealth, successful, freedom, social power

Responsible, loyal, social order, self-respect

Healthy, honesty, social justice, social power

Shame, influential, family security, self-respect

Social power, unclean, honesty, authority

Accepting my portion in life, insignificant, broad minded, social
order, imprudence
Unhealthy, social disgrace, social justice, social recognition

The world in disharmony, social justice, national security, authority
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Shared Values Set: Group 4
Decision Consideration
Is Mustaq Singh
courageous enough to risk
getting caught for stealing?
Isn’t it only natural for a
loving father to care so
much for his family that he
would steal?
Shouldn’t the community’s
laws be upheld?
Does Mustaq Singh know a
good recipe for preparing
soup from
tree bark?
Does the rich man have any
legal right to store food
when other
people are starving?
Is the motive of Mustaq
Singh to steal for himself or
to steal for his family?
What values are going to be
the basis for social
cooperation?
Is the epitome of eating
reconcilable with the
culpability of stealing?
Does the rich man deserve
to be robbed for being so
greedy?
Isn’t private property an
institution to enable the rich
to exploit the poor?
Would stealing bring about
more total good for
everybody concerned
or wouldn’t it?
Are laws getting in the way
of the most basic claim of
any member of society?

Value Expressed
Meaning of life, daring, capable, family security, health

Inner harmony, family security, authority, daring

Social justice, social injustice, authority, obedient, social order
Creativity, unhealthy, healthy, harming the environment

Social power, powerless, social disgrace, authority, social order

Humble, sense of belonging, family security, unfaithful

Equality, influential, powerlessness, social recognition

Detachment, accepting portion in life, equality, social disgrace

Arrogant, indebtedness, wealth

Disorder, inequality, uninitelligent

Social order, equality, a world of beauty, disobedient

World of ugliness, obedient, enjoying life, freedom, insignificant
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Shared Values Set: Group 5
Decision Consideration
Is Mustaq Singh
courageous enough to risk
getting caught for stealing?
Isn’t it only natural for a
loving father to care so
much for his family that he
would steal?
Shouldn’t the community’s
laws be upheld?
Does Mustaq Singh know a
good recipe for preparing
soup from tree bark?
Does the rich man have any
legal right to store food
when other
people are starving?
Is the motive of Mustaq
Singh to steal for himself or
to steal for his family?
What values are going to be
the basis for social
cooperation?
Is the epitome of eating
reconcilable with the
culpability of stealing?
Does the rich man deserve
to be robbed for being so
greedy?
Isn’t private property an
institution to enable the rich
to exploit the poor?
Would stealing bring about
more total good for
everybody concerned
or wouldn’t it?
Are laws getting in the way
of the most basic claim of
any member of society?

Value Expressed
Family security, meaning of life, responsible

Family security, responsible

Social power, equality, social order, authority, freedom
Intelligent, creativity, independence

Intelligent, social justice, social injustice, social order, shame

Family security, humble

Social order, helpful, equality, social recognition

Accepting portion in life, inner conflict, inner harmony, social
injustice
Wealth, bias, social disorder, not accepting my portion in life

Social order, capability, social injustice, inner conflict

Social disorder, honest, world of beauty

Authority, inequality, freedom
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Appendix F
N2 Score Descriptive Statistics and t-Test Results by Group
N2Score Pre 1
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode

N2Score Post 1

Standard Deviation
Sample Variance

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
10.63878455 Deviation
113.1837367 Sample Variance

Kurtosis

2.377987165 Kurtosis

Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

32.4707919
3.207714234
36.66027801
#N/A

-1.478004326
35.39136075
7.020660722
42.41202148
357.1787109
11

N2Score Pre 2
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

34.37175236
3.970954016
36.21419279
#N/A
13.17016453
173.4532337
0.393679647
0.573774133
41.5751324
12.0095456
53.58467801
378.089276
11

N2Score Post 2

26.14421447
3.203164508
26.69264657
#N/A

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
14.32498717 Deviation
205.2052573 Sample Variance

30.27666326
3.712329955
24.90875872
#N/A

-0.973004056
0.078509774
50.39917637
1.662813234
52.06198961
522.8842893
20

16.60204427
275.627874
1.452984637
0.228345857
51.9509142
6.446759816
58.39767402
605.5332652
20

Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
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N2Score Pre 3
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

27.13117425
2.806625106
27.79754756
#N/A
11.57201176
133.9114562
-1.356869269
0.158825174
32.5451282
11.69458314
44.23971134
461.2299622
17

N2Score Pre 4
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

28.30691515
2.270615948
30.27532653
#N/A
11.12370095
123.7367227
-0.488615462
-0.108285866
45.05154414
5.300049497
50.35159364
679.3659637
24

N2 Score Pre 5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
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N2Score Post 3

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

33.23663206
3.120815882
33.68428625
#N/A
12.86745352
165.5713601
0.530728906
0.721912097
49.19446038
15.08192823
64.2763886
565.0227451
17

N2Score Post 4
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

21.52186151
2.530324336
19.99945096
#N/A
12.39600701
153.6609899
0.872555273
0.174020636
44.10436412
1.186909712
45.29127383
516.5246762
24

N2 Score Post 5

36.21427423 Mean
2.652552161 Standard Error
36.88693907 Median

38.29193961
2.897340967
38.21388959
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Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

Mode
Standard
15.69271021 Deviation
246.2611538 Sample Variance
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#N/A

#N/A

-0.752802801
0.008098017
61.03082413
5.412950513
66.44377464
1267.499598
35

17.14090032
293.8104638
0.851866224
0.09147799
63.07693037
9.906068215
72.98299859
1340.217886
35

Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
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t-Test: Paired Two Sample for
Means N2 Score Group 1
Mean
Variance
Observations
Pearson Correlation
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

Variable 1
32.4707919
113.1837367
11
0.805707725
0
10
-0.808209657
0.218886928
1.812461123
0.437773855
2.228138852

Variable 2
34.37175236
173.4532337
11

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
N2 Score Group 2
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
26.14421447 30.27666326
Variance
205.2052573 275.627874
Observations
20
20
Pearson Correlation
0.90962854
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
19
t Stat
2.662772899
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.007686697
t Critical one-tail
1.729132812
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.015373394
t Critical two-tail
2.093024054
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
N2 Score Group 3
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
27.13117425 33.23663206
Variance
133.9114562 165.5713601
Observations
17
17
Pearson Correlation
0.500398825
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
16
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t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

2.052247254
0.028440102
1.745883676
0.056880204
2.119905299

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
N2 Score Group 4
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
28.30691515 21.52186151
Variance
123.7367227 153.6609899
Observations
24
24
Pearson Correlation
0.325354866
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
23
t Stat
2.426383951
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.011748508
t Critical one-tail
1.713871528
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.023497015
t Critical two-tail
2.06865761

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
N2 Score Group 5
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
36.21427423 38.29193961
Variance
246.2611538 293.8104638
Observations
35
35
Pearson Correlation
0.881595369
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
34
t Stat
-1.5153403
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.069464435
t Critical one-tail
1.690924255
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.13892887
t Critical two-tail
2.032244509
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Appendix G
Stage 23 and 4P Descriptive Statistics and t-Tests
Stage 23 Descriptive By Group
Stage 23 Pre Group 1
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

28.36363636
2.49826386
30
32
8.285803851
68.65454545
1.059282758
0.502441968
30
16
46
312
11

Stage 23 Pre Group 2
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

27.6
3.164274258
23
12

Stage 23 Post Group 1
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

24.36363636
3.878314365
20
20
12.86291357
165.4545455
1.686852635
1.253477284
44
10
54
268
11

Stage 23 Post Group 2

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
14.15106468 Deviation
200.2526316 Sample Variance
0.129339419 Kurtosis
0.825606231 Skewness
48 Range
12 Minimum
60 Maximum
552 Sum
20 Count

27.6
3.45984484
25
32
15.47289651
239.4105263
0.436354486
0.576714106
54
8
62
552
20
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Stage 23 Pre Group 3
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

Stage 23 Post Group 3

30.25
3.341032774
31
28

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
13.3641311 Deviation
178.6 Sample Variance
1.190000107 Kurtosis
0.314918089 Skewness
40 Range
10 Minimum
50 Maximum
484 Sum
16 Count

Stage 23 Pre Group 4
33.08333333
1.937349028
34
34

174

26.58823529
3.359642426
30
10
13.85216059
191.8823529
1.116419022
0.115266434
44
4
48
452
17

Stage 23 Post Group 4

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
9.491033144 Deviation
90.07971014 Sample Variance
0.128868487 Kurtosis
0.390785004 Skewness
36 Range
14 Minimum
50 Maximum
794 Sum
24 Count

35.5
2.470844484
39
38
12.10461644
146.5217391
-0.68507537
0.588717017
42
12
54
852
24
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Stage 23 Pre Group 5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
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Stage 23 Pre Group 5

25.25714286
2.152326417
24
16

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
12.7333348 Deviation
162.1378151 Sample Variance
0.971649409 Kurtosis
0.332948282 Skewness
44 Range
6 Minimum
50 Maximum
884 Sum
35 Count

24.4
2.117236188
24
18
12.52573821
156.8941176
0.583931879
0.337345415
48
4
52
854
35

Stage 23 Descriptive By School
Stage 23 Pre MSC
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance

Stage 23 Post MSC

28.625
1.791584197
28
32

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
12.41245942 Deviation
154.0691489 Sample Variance
Kurtosis
0.482283949 Kurtosis
Skewness
0.386954188 Skewness
Range
50 Range
Minimum
10 Minimum
Maximum
60 Maximum
Sum
1374 Sum
Count
48 Count
Stage 23 Descriptive All Data
Stage 23 Pre All Data
Mean
Standard Error

26.5
2.035587635
26
32
14.10296483
198.893617
0.503608453
0.468350003
58
4
62
1272
48

Stage 23 PostAll Data

28.52336449 Mean
1.17648639 Standard Error

27.8317757
1.326618413
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Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance

28 Median
32 Mode
Standard
12.16966984 Deviation
148.100864 Sample Variance

Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

-0.7652174
0.138215681
54
6
60
3052
107

Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

176
26
8
13.72264757
188.3110563
0.883736879
0.19703414
58
4
62
2978
107

Stage 23 t-Test By Group
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Stage 23 Group 1
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
28.36363636 24.36363636
Variance
68.65454545 165.4545455
Observations
11
11
Pearson Correlation
0.831815499
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
10
t Stat
1.760281668
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.05442699
t Critical one-tail
1.812461123
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.10885398
t Critical two-tail
2.228138852

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Stage 23 Group 2
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
27.6
27.6
Variance
200.2526316 239.4105263
Observations
20
20
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Pearson Correlation
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

0.845343725
0
19
4.76546E-17
0.5
1.729132812
1
2.093024054

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Stage 23 Group 3
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
30 26.58823529
Variance
168.5 191.8823529
Observations
17
17
Pearson Correlation
0.695172434
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
16
t Stat
1.338917165
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.099655534
t Critical one-tail
1.745883676
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.199311069
t Critical two-tail
2.119905299
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Stage 23 Group 4
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
33.08333333
35.5
Variance
90.07971014 146.5217391
Observations
24
24
Pearson Correlation
0.321303408
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
23
t Stat
0.927957396
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.181533137
t Critical one-tail
1.713871528
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.363066274
t Critical two-tail
2.06865761
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t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Stage 23 Group 5
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
25.25714286
24.4
Variance
162.1378151 156.8941176
Observations
35
35
Pearson Correlation
0.841334993
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
34
t Stat
0.712482319
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.240513679
t Critical one-tail
1.690924255
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.481027358
t Critical two-tail
2.032244509
Stage 23 t-Test By School
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Stage 23 MSC
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
28.625
26.5
Variance
154.0691489 198.893617
Observations
48
48
Pearson Correlation
0.776545246
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
47
t Stat
1.634913438
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.054374096
t Critical one-tail
1.677926722
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.108748192
t Critical two-tail
2.011740514

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Stage 23 CSU
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
28.44067797 28.91525424
Variance
145.8024547 180.3202805
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Observations
Pearson Correlation
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
df

59
0.706922165

179
59

0
58
0.370363041
0.35623057
1.671552762
0.712461139
2.001717484

t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail
Stage 23 t-Test All Data

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Stage 23 All Data
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
28.52336449 27.8317757
Variance
148.100864 188.3110563
Observations
107
107
Pearson Correlation
0.735815926
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
106
t Stat
0.751376624
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.227045501
t Critical one-tail
1.659356034
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.454091002
t Critical two-tail
1.982597262

4P Descriptive By Group
4P Pre Group 1
Mean
Standard Error
Median

4P Post Group 1

34.72727273 Mean
3.294874557 Standard Error
32 Median

35.63636364
4.559251787
32
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Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

32 Mode
Standard
10.92786264 Deviation
119.4181818 Sample Variance
0.230159095 Kurtosis
0.99486071 Skewness
34 Range
22 Minimum
56 Maximum
382 Sum
11 Count

4P Pre Group 2
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
14.31193834 Deviation
204.8315789 Sample Variance
0.129645373 Kurtosis
0.447850824 Skewness
52 Range
4 Minimum
56 Maximum
658 Sum
20 Count

36.11764706
4.106918797
38
42
16.93326

32
15.1213275
228.6545455
-0.9986119
0.155499382
46
14
60
392
11

4P Post Group 2

32.9
3.200246701
36
40

4P Pre Group 3
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34.4
2.693461869
37
40
12.04552767
145.0947368
0.751960456
0.373060661
40
12
52
688
20

4P Post Group 3
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard

36
3.910769444
32
40
16.1245155
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Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

286.7352941
0.047674091
0.46247221
64
10
74
614
17

4P Pre Group 4
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
13.14688479 Deviation
172.8405797 Sample Variance
0.290422452 Kurtosis
0.049015264 Skewness
52 Range
4 Minimum
56 Maximum
772 Sum
24 Count

30.45714286
2.257515127
30
18
13.3556396

260
0.953722739
1.098900043
60
16
76
612
17

4P Post Group 4

32.16666667
2.68359662
32
32

4P Pre Group 5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard

Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
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35.25
2.553237502
38
38
12.50825814
156.4565217
0.376249665
0.087705898
48
14
62
846
24

4P Pre Group 5
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard

30.05714286
2.502416599
28
20
14.80449625
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Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

Deviation
178.3731092 Sample Variance
0.723399491 Kurtosis
0.554350578 Skewness
50 Range
12 Minimum
62 Maximum
1066 Sum
35 Count

182

219.1731092
0.028662321
0.546164043
64
2
66
1052
35

4P Descriptive By School
4P Pre MSC
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

34.45833333
2.081018217
34
32
14.41771713
207.8705674
0.246005245
0.188766611
70
4
74
1654
48

4P Pre 4 CSU
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard

31.15254237
1.716426902
30
18
13.1841252

4P Post MSC
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

35.25
2.022589626
34
40
14.01291198
196.3617021
0.188115249
0.510466575
64
12
76
1692
48

4P Post 4 CSU
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard

32.16949153
1.827952412
34
38
14.04076889
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Deviation
Sample Variance

Deviation
173.8211572 Sample Variance

Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

-0.68131744
0.343731487
58
4
62
1838
59

Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
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197.1431911
0.330805324
0.301949685
64
2
66
1898
59

4P Descriptive All Data
4P Pre All Data
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

32.63551402
1.33258026
32
22

4P Post All Data

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard
13.7843174 Deviation
190.0074061 Sample Variance
0.229249449 Kurtosis
0.287380517 Skewness
70 Range
4 Minimum
74 Maximum
3492 Sum
107 Count

33.55140187
1.357933749
34
38
14.04657592
197.3062952
0.106262599
0.380887114
74
2
76
3590
107

4P t-Test By Group
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
4P Group 1
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
34.72727273 35.63636364
Variance
119.4181818 228.6545455
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Observations
Pearson Correlation
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

11
0.778794224
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11

0
10
0.316607924
0.379025732
1.812461123
0.758051465
2.228138852

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
4P Group 2
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
32.9
34.4
Variance
204.8315789 145.0947368
Observations
20
20
Pearson Correlation
0.844084322
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
19
t Stat
0.874113875
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.196485577
t Critical one-tail
1.729132812
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.392971154
t Critical two-tail
2.093024054

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
4P Group 3

Mean
Variance
Observations

Variable
Variable 1
2
36.11764706
36
286.7352941
260
17
17
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Pearson Correlation
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

0.783766186
0
16
0.044515947
0.482521995
1.745883676
0.96504399
2.119905299

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
4P Group 4
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
32.16666667
35.25
Variance
172.8405797 156.4565217
Observations
24
24
Pearson Correlation
0.643800689
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
23
t Stat
1.393156989
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.088446019
t Critical one-tail
1.713871528
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.176892038
t Critical two-tail
2.06865761

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
4P Group 5
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
30.45714286 30.05714286
Variance
178.3731092 219.1731092
Observations
35
35
Pearson Correlation
0.791224536
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
34
t Stat
0.257192263
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P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

0.399290258
1.690924255
0.798580517
2.032244509

4P t-Test By School
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
4P MSC
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
34.45833333
35.25
Variance
207.8705674 196.3617021
Observations
48
48
Pearson Correlation
0.792419025
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
47
t Stat
0.598298536
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.276256622
t Critical one-tail
1.677926722
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.552513245
t Critical two-tail
2.011740514

t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
4P CSU
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
31.15254237 32.16949153
Variance
173.8211572 197.1431911
Observations
59
59
Pearson Correlation
0.733976524
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
58
t Stat
-
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P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

0.784182628
0.218061989
1.671552762
0.436123978
2.001717484

4P t-Test All Data
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
4P All Data
Variable 1
Variable 2
Mean
32.63551402 33.55140187
Variance
190.0074061 197.3062952
Observations
107
107
Pearson Correlation
0.76371659
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
0
df
106
t Stat
0.990060057
P(T<=t) one-tail
0.162199702
t Critical one-tail
1.659356034
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.324399403
t Critical two-tail
1.982597262
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Appendix H
George Fox University Human Subjects Committee Approval

From: BeckyJensen<rjensen@georgefox.edu> Subject: HSRC Approval
Date: April 2, 2013 4:31:36 PM AKDT
To: "HollyBell(me.com)"<hollybell@me.com>
Cc: Paul Shelton <pshelton@georgefox.edu>

Hi Holly,
I have good news for you! I just received word that your HSRC has been approved! The form couldn't be sent today
because of computer problems, but someone from that committee gave me a call to let me know it had been
approved and you could move on with your research.
I apologize for the length of time you've had to wait, but at least now it's done. I will send you the form with the
approval signatures as soon as I receive it.
-Becky Jensen
Administrative Assistant
GFU School of Business
503-554-2821

